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MARKET TRIUMPHALISM, ELECTORAL
PATHOLOGIES, AND THE ABIDING WISDOM OF
FIRST AMENDMENT ACCESS RIGHTS
Gregory P. Magarian*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Jerome Barron's seminal writings that advocate a First Amendment
right of access to the media' make a powerful case that constitutional
speech protection must actually yield dynamic, broad-based public
debate in order to ensure the vitality of our democratic society. Barron
posited that expressive freedom's purpose is to enable effective
democratic debate, and he accordingly called on courts to invoke the
First Amendment in order to provide underfinanced and socially
marginalized speakers access to the infrastructure of public discourse.
The mass media's persistent incapacity to inform and guide public
discussion of critical issues-most notably, in recent years, the decision
to invade Iraq 3 -- reaffirms that argument's urgency. In the four decades
since Barron's seminal writings on access rights appeared, however, the
Supreme Court and free speech theorists have largely ignored or scorned
his prescription for a First Amendment right of access to the media,
along with similar democracy-advancing arguments for strong First
* Professor of Law, Villanova University. Thanks to Marvin Ammori, Jerome Barron, Mike
Carroll, Robert Post, Chaim Saiman, and workshop participants at the Washington University Law
School for helpful comments on earlier drafts.
1. See JEROME A. BARRON, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FOR WHOM?: THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO

MASS MEDIA (1973); Jerome A. Barron, An Emerging First Amendment Right of Access to the
Media?, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 487 (1969) [hereinafter Barron, Emerging Right]; Jerome A.
Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641 (1967)
[hereinafter Barron, New Right].
2. See, e.g., Barron, New Right, supra note 1, at 1641-42, 1666-67.
3. For an indictment of the United States media's failures to facilitate effective public debate
before and during the early part of the Iraq War, see Gregory P. Magarian, The First Amendment,
the Public-Private Distinction, and Nongovernmental Suppression of Wartime Political Debate, 73
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 101, 117-21 (2004) [hereinafter Magarian, Public-Private Distinction].
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Amendment rights of access to the political process. When the end
toward which First Amendment access rights would aim is so obviously
important, and when institutions that control access to public debate
continue to suppress and exclude crucial dissenting perspectives, why
has the case for access rights fallen so far out of favor?
This Article defends and elaborates Barron's argument that courts
can and should employ the First Amendment to advance equalization of
access to means of expression. It identifies and refutes the two principal
intellectual critiques of that argument, which I call the libertarian
critique and the regulatory reform critique. Part II assesses the state of
Barron's legacy. The first section emphasizes the elements of Barron's
case for access rights that provoke the two critiques: an egalitarian,
instrumental theory of expressive freedom, opposed by the libertarian
critique; and the commitment to a judicially enforced constitutional
requirement of broadly distributed expressive opportunities, opposed by
the regulatory reform critique. The second section accounts for the
importance of these critiques by documenting First Amendment
doctrine's wholesale rejection of access rights. This section also
addresses technological optimists' disdain for distributive accounts of
expressive freedom, explaining why developments in information
technology have not diminished Barron's case for access rights.
The Article then proceeds to its primary task: assessing the two
intellectual positions that underwrite courts' rejection of access rights.
Part III critically analyzes the first of those positions, the libertarian
critique, which stands on a foundation of market triumphalism. The first
section presents the views of one group of libertarian thinkers, including
Charles Fried, Steven Gey, Jon McGinnis, and Christopher Yoo, whom I
classify as conservative libertarians. These critics openly espouse a First
Amendment theory that elevates the autonomy of speakers, including
powerful institutions, above all other concerns. They advocate a regime
in which the economic market dictates people's opportunities to
participate in democratic discourse, and they assail any departure from
their laissez-faire vision as statist tyranny. The second section presents
the views of a second group of libertarian critics, including Robert Post,
Martin Redish, and Kathleen Sullivan, whom I classify as progressive
libertarians. These theorists sympathize with access rights advocates'
egalitarian concerns, and they offer nuanced accounts of the First
Amendment that acknowledge the importance of effective public debate
for a healthy democratic system. My analysis, however, reveals that
progressive libertarians fully embrace the conservative libertarians' core
commitments: the autonomy-driven theory of expressive freedom, the
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insistence on market distribution of expressive opportunities, and the
rhetorical strategy of demonizing access rights advocates as creeping
tyrants. Part II concludes by setting forth the primary empirical,
theoretical, and normative reasons to reject the libertarians' faith in
unfettered market control of democratic discourse.
Part IV critically analyzes the other principal attack on access
rights, the regulatory reform critique. The first section describes the
arguments that regulatory reformers, including C. Edwin Baker, Jack
Balkin, and Mark Tushnet, advance against access rights. Regulatory
reformers agree with access rights advocates that public discourse needs
to become more egalitarian and informative. They also agree that
government can and should play a role in improving public discourse.
They break with access rights advocates, however, by arguing that courts
should not invoke the First Amendment to broaden media access.
Regulatory reformers trust the elected branches of government to
implement access reforms, and they exemplify the prevailing academic
pessimism about the utility of judicially enforced constitutional rights as
a vehicle for progressive social change. Accordingly, they urge courts to
narrow the scope of the First Amendment so that legislators and
regulators may enact progressive access rules. The second section takes
issue with the regulatory reform critique. I first contend that, just as the
libertarians indulge an uncritical faith in the market, regulatory
reformers indulge an uncritical faith in the elected branches of
government. Our present electoral system suffers from an unusual
amalgam of electoral pathologies-some that erode elected officials'
accountability to the public generally, others that perpetuate the
exclusion of poor and socially marginalized people from electoral
politics-that dim any hope for legislative or regulatory efforts to
broaden media access. I then contend that constitutional rights provide a
stronger theoretical basis, and courts a stronger institutional vehicle, for
broadening access to the means of expression.
This Article endeavors to show that Barron's case for access rights
remains as persuasive today as it was forty years ago. The libertarian
critique of access rights represents a reckless plunge into the market
triumphalism that has become a regrettably dominant feature of postCold War political rhetoric. The regulatory reform critique places
untenable reliance on elected officials in a system rife with electoral
pathologies and undervalues judicial review in a field that constitutional
courts are well positioned to navigate. Moving forward, advocates of
access rights should pick up Barron's flag and consider how best to
achieve the aims he so eloquently articulated. This Article's conclusion
Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2007
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suggests First Amendment-based attacks on the very electoral
pathologies that undermine the regulatory reform critique as a first step
toward broadening media access and encouraging reformist impulses in
the elected branches.
II.

THE LEGACY OF BARRON'S CASE FOR ACCESS RIGHTS

Professor Barron's writings form the cornerstone of a case for First
Amendment rights of access to the means of public debate. The first
section of this Part describes Barron's case for access rights,
emphasizing two key aspects of his argument: an underlying
commitment to an egalitarian and instrumental theory of expressive
freedom, and close attention to the institutional benefits and hazards that
various public and private institutions present for the development of
informative and inclusive public debate. These theoretical and
institutional elements of Barron's case for access rights provide the
context for the Article's subsequent discussion of the intellectual
currents that have led present First Amendment doctrine to reject access
rights. The second section notes the Supreme Court's steadfast refusal to
recognize access rights, and it discusses why access rights remain crucial
even in an era of broadly accessible information technology.
A. Barron's Theoretical Groundingand InstitutionalInsights
In advocating a First Amendment right of public access to the
media,4 Barron sought to constrain "the unanticipated power which the
marriage of technology and capital has placed in the relatively few hands
which dominate mass communications." 5 Employing economic and
sociological insights, he explained how the profit structures and
communicative dynamics of the mass media had created strong
incentives for media corporations to avoid presenting opinions on
controversial issues. 6 In these circumstances, the conventional "romantic
view" of the First Amendment as a shield for speakers' autonomy had
4. Barron's emphasis on the word "media," combined with his incisive analysis of the print
and broadcast media, should not obscure the breadth of his conception of access rights, which
extended to real property. See Barron, Emerging Right, supra note 1, at 492-94 (analyzing and
praising Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308
(1968)).
5. Barron, Emerging Right, supra note 1,at 506.
6. See Barron, New Right, supra note 1,at 1644-47. Barron's view that the mass media's
lack of ideology drives their failure to engage the public in political debate provides an interesting
contrast to contemporary arguments from both the left and right that media outlets deliberately
advance their own policy preferences.
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"perpetuated the lack of legal interest in the availability to various
interest groups of access to means of communication. ' 7 Accordingly,
Barron called on courts to interpret the First Amendment as ensuring a
positive right of access for otherwise excluded speakers and ideas, to be
applied with sensitivity to the distinctive contexts of different
communications media. 8 By "access," Barron meant not merely equal
time for opposing opinions-a concept whose limitations he well
recognized-but open space for a full range of subjects and viewpoints. 9
Among the forms he saw access rights taking were a public right to have
media outlets present discussion of public issues, 10 a right for political
speakers to purchase advertising space or time on equal terms with other
members of the general public, 1 and a right to have newspapers
12
consider submissions for publication without ideological bias.
Barron's call for access rights grew out of an egalitarian,
instrumental theory of the First Amendment. He emphasized "the
positive dimension of the First Amendment: The First Amendment must
be read to require opportunity for expression as well as protection for
expression once secured."'13 In the tradition of Justice Brandeis, 4 and
Alexander Meiklejohn, 15 Barron contended that the Constitution granted
expressive freedom, not out of a romantic commitment to abstract
autonomy, but rather because of our democratic system's need for
inclusive, thorough debate about matters of public concern. 16 He
believed the equal participation values central to democratic ideals
should inform the expressive freedom integral to implementing those
ideals. 17 The First Amendment guaranteed not just a private right of
powerful institutions to speak, but also "public rights in the

7. Id. at 1642.
8. See id. at 1653 (advocating contextual analysis).
9. See BARRON, supra note 1, at 150-59 (exploring differences between "access" and
"fairness").
10. See id.
at 151.
11. See id. at 55-59 (proposing model statute).
12. See id.
at 48.
13. Barron, Emerging Right, supra note 1, at 509.
14. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), discussed
in Barron, New Right, supranote 1,at 1648-49.
15.

See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF

THE PEOPLE 25-28 (Oxford Univ. Press 1965) (1948) discussed in Barron, New Right, supra note 1,
at 1653-54.
16. See Barron, New Right, supra note 1, at 1673 (stressing necessity of "adequate
opportunity for debate, for charge and countercharge").
17. See id. at 1647 (criticizing romantic view of First Amendment for failing to recognize
"inequality in the power to communicate ideas").
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communications process." 1 8 To the extent the media impeded rather than
aided in broadening participation in public debate, the proper role of

First Amendment doctrine was not to shield media owners' autonomy,
but rather to obligate them to distribute expressive opportunities more
broadly.19 Barron viewed access rights as an alternative to left-wing calls
for state suppression of right-wing ideas, 20 and he emphasized that his
inclusive vision encompassed speakers on the right as well as the left.21
In particular, he found access rights inconsistent with prohibitions on
hate speech, 2 advocating vigorous efforts to open expressive

opportunities

for

members

of

historically

disadvantaged

and

marginalized communities. 21
Barron portrayed access rights as serving two values that appear
inextricably linked in his conception of democracy: better informing the
public and broadening participation in public debate. First, Barron
maintained that the validity of a First Amendment access claim should
turn on "whether the material for which access is sought is indeed
suppressed and underrepresented., 24 Exposure to the broadest possible
range of information optimizes the effectiveness of the political
community in influencing and evaluating government decisions. 25 Thus,
Barron emphasized "[t]he failures of existing media.., to convey
unorthodox, unpopular, and new ideas... [and] to afford full and
effective hearing for all points of view. 26 Second, Barron tied the force

18. Id. at 1665.
19. Barron chose, in my view, an unhelpful illustration ofjudicial solicitude for media power
when he criticized New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), as a judicial license for
powerful media to squelch debate by attacking reputations. See Barron, New Right, supra note 1, at
1656-60; see also BARRON, supra note 1, at 7-12. Barron's analysis of Sullivan paid insufficient
attention to the Court's careful assessment of the power dynamics between public officials and their
critics, see Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-83, as well as the particular power disparity between the Jim
Crow-enforcing plaintiff and the civil rights activists named as nonmedia defendants in the libel
action. BARRON, supra note 1, at 9-12. Given those factors, Sullivan actually stands out as one of
the Court's most incisive defenses of public discourse against private abridgement.
20. See BARRON, supra note 1, at 75-81 (criticizing Herbert Marcuse's arguments for
"repressive tolerance").
21. See id. at 85-89 (sympathetically considering Vice President Agnew's charges that liberal
elitists were excluding conservative voices from the mass media).
22. See id. at 301-02.
23. See id. at 300.
24. Barron, New Right, supra note 1, at 1677.
25. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 96-110 (2003) (arguing that
legal protection of freedom of speech "reduc[es] the likelihood of blunders by government," while
asserting that people's natural tendency "to defer to the crowd," as well as the fact that "people are
often unheard even if they speak," presents an obstacle to a "well-functioning democracy," which
needs not only a legal principle of free speech, but also a "culture of freespeech").
26. Barron, New Right, supra note 1, at 1647.
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of access claims to "the degree to which the petitioner seeking access
represents a significant sector of the community., 2 7 This principle would
enable members of substantial groups marginalized by the majority or by
economic forces to engage and influence public debate. By opening
debate to marginalized speakers, access rights would advance "the
relationship between a stable and vital political order and adequate
access for protest to the significant means of communication" 28 and
satisfy "the longing for an information process which is truly
participatory. 2 9 Barron's linkage of these informational and inclusive
values helps to explain his insistence on full-scale access rights, as
opposed to more modest media reforms.
Central to Barron's case for access rights was an attack on the First
Amendment doctrine's uncritical acceptance of a rigid public-private
distinction. "Only the new media of communication can lay sentiments
before the public," he explained, "and it is they rather than government
who can most effectively abridge expression by nullifying the
opportunity for an idea to win acceptance., 30 The defining characteristic
of the romantic First Amendment doctrine Barron opposed was its
"singular[] indifferen[ce] to the reality and implications of
nongovernmental obstructions to the spread of political truth., 31 He cast
powerful media institutions not as legal persons with paramount
expressive autonomy rights but as "nongoverning minorities ' 32 prone to
abusing their control over important communicative infrastructure to
stifle public debate. He charged any medium that could support
democratic discourse with the responsibility of doing so. 3 3 Accordingly,
he contended that "[a]n access-oriented approach to the [F]irst
[A]mendment implies affirmative obligation on government as well as

27.

Id. at 1677.

28. Barron, Emerging Right, supra note 1, at 488; see also Barron, New Right, supra note 1,
at 1650. In this respect, Barron's analysis ties First Amendment access rights to the familiar "social
safety valve" argument for expressive freedom. See Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory
of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 884-86 (1963) (explaining value of First Amendment for

preserving balance between stability and change).
29. Barron, Emerging Right, supra note 1, at 509.
30. Barron, New Right, supra note 1, at 1656, 1669 (suggesting that courts properly could
treat newspapers, at least those with monopoly power, as having "quasi-public status" for purposes
of constitutional analysis).
31. Id. at 1643.

32. Id. at 1649.
33.

See Barron, Emerging Right, supra note 1, at 494 (claiming that "any natural or obvious

forum in our society [bears] responsibilities for stimulating the communication of ideas"); see also
Barron, New Right, supra note 1, at 1675 (contending that "the nature of the communications

process imposes quasi-public functions on these quasi-public instrumentalities").
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on the private sector and its concerns., 34 Even so, Barron opposed
government surveillance of the press, 35 and he conceived of the
government's role in mandating access to privately owned media as
strictly procedural, disavowing any understanding of the First
Amendment in which the government influenced the content of ideas.36
Access 3rights,
in his conception, would "build counterbalances into each
7
sector.

A crucial but little noted feature of Barron's case for access rights is
his primary faith in courts, rather than legislators or bureaucrats, to
broaden access to the media. Barron advocated not just access regulation
but specifically access rights. He contended that the First Amendment,
given its instrumental purpose and egalitarian values, did not merely
permit but rather required broad access to the means of
communication. 38 He recognized that an access rights regime would
present difficult legal questions, such as which points of view were
absent from public discourse, where and how to require access for
dissident speakers, and how much media attention to public
controversies would adequately feed public debate. 39 However, he
anticipated and adroitly answered concerns about judicial competence to
resolve access claims: the necessary analysis, which would turn on "the
public use and public need," was "no more complex a judicial task than
is presently involved in analyzing the puzzles of apportionment, school
desegregation and obscenity., 40 While Barron endorsed legislative and
regulatory reforms to expand access, particularly in the context of the
electronic media, 4' he believed "[i]t is by the judicial process that we
shall establish the contours for answers to questions which a working

34.

Barron, Emerging Right, supra note 1, at 494.

35.

See BARRON, supra note 1,at 54.

36. See Barron, EmergingRight, supra note 1,at 507.
37. Id. at 509.
38. See BARRON, supra note 1, at 22-25 (advocating judicial creation of a right of access to
the press); see also Barron, New Right, supra note 1, at 1678 (positing that "it is open to the courts
to fashion a remedy for a right of access, at least in the most arbitrary cases, independently of
legislation").
39. See Barton, Emerging Right, supra note 1,at 496 (summarizing legal questions that
access rights claims would present).
40. Barron, Emerging Right, supra note 1, at 495; see also BARRON, supra note 1,at 65
(identifying judicial independence and experience in enforcing First Amendment guarantees as
reasons to favorjudicial administration of access rights).
41. See Barron, New Right, supra note 1, at 1674-76 (discussing sources of constitutional
authority for access rights legislation); see also Barron, Emerging Right, supra note 1, at 500
("[T]he existing structure of broadcast regulation permits an understanding of the problem of access
which can be inclusive enough to reach failure to recognize or seek out dominant public issues.").
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right of access obviously presents. 4 2 Even in areas of legislative action,
such as right-of-reply statutes, Barron maintained that "[a] right of
access law is far more likely to serve as an effective counterpoise to
media power if administered in the courts. 43 Barron's advocacy of a
judicially enforced constitutional right of media access, while
substantively radical, was also procedurally conservative. Acutely aware
of the ignoble history of press licensing, he posited that-at least in
cases of such traditionally nonregulated media as newspapers-courts
would more fairly strike the proper balance between publishers' editorial
interests and the public's access interests.44
In the two decades following publication of Barron's work on
access rights, his arguments received forceful scholarly defense and
elaboration, most notably from Owen Fiss 45 and Cass Sunstein. 46 Like
42. Barron, Emerging Right, supra note 1, at 496. The necessity of judicial enforcement for
an access rights regime has grown since Barron's time, as the Supreme Court has narrowed its view
of Congress' power to take the initiative in protecting constitutional rights. Compare Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 652-53 (1966) (suggesting substantive congressional power to determine
content of constitutional rights), with City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519-20 (1997)
(holding that Congress does not have the power to decree the substance of a constitutional
Amendment).
43. BARRON, supra note 1, at 64.
44. See Barron, Emerging Right, supra note 1, at 495 (recognizing that "[1]icensing of the
press has the least honorable history of any enduring constitutional problem" and outside the
electronic media, the obligation of the media "to be sensitive to their responsibility to adequately
present the contemporary life of ideas is ... best secured ... through the courts"); see also Barron,
New Right, supra note 1, at 1667 (noting that "[o]ne alternative is a judicial remedy affording
individuals and groups desiring to voice views on public issues a right of non-discriminatory access
to the community newspaper," although in a number of cases the "right of access has simply been
denied"). Barron, perhaps mistakenly, valued the print media's contributions to public discourse
above those of the electronic media. See Barron, Emerging Right, supra note 1, at 495. Even so, he
avoided the trap of premising his case for access rights on technological factors, emphasizing that
economic consolidation in the print media posed as great an impediment to the diversity of public
discourse as technological limitations of the electronic media. Compare Barron, New Right, supra
note 1, at 1666 (noting the limitation on the number of newspapers is caused by economic rather
than technological factors), with Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 387-89 (1969)
(emphasizing broadcast spectrum scarcity in upholding FCC's fairness doctrine). His argument for
access rights turned not on scarcity but on the societal benefits of informative, inclusive debate and
the social reality of inequalities in the distribution of expressive opportunities. See Barron, New
Right, supra note 1, at 1645 (emphasizing the need to focus on content rather than technology).
45. See OWEN M. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE MANY USES OF
STATE POWER 151 (1996) [hereinafter Flss, LIBERALISM DIVIDED] (noting it is "[1]egal doctrine
[that] must protect the press from state regulations that stifle public debate ... but not those that
have the opposite effect"); OWEN M. FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 67 (1996) (indicating that
limitations on newspapers are derived from the loss of the economic value associated with
"displac[ing] an article or program that a company deem[s] more profitable"); Owen M. Fiss, Free
Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1410 (1986) [hereinafter Fiss, Social
Structure] (noting Barron's view of electronic media as a modem "electric street corner" and how
"[t]his view moves us closer to a true understanding of the problem of free speech in modem

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2007

9

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 3 [2007], Art. 13
HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 35:1373

the Vietnam era that fostered Barron's ideas and the McCarthy era
during which Meiklejohn developed his First Amendment theory, the
present war on terrorism would appear to cast the importance of access
rights into particularly sharp relief.4 7 Unfortunately, First Amendment
doctrine and more recent scholarly commentary have almost uniformly
rejected Barron's First Amendment vision.
B.

The Present State ofAccess Rights

The Supreme Court's rejection of access rights is a familiar chapter
in recent First Amendment history. Because I have told that story at
length elsewhere, I will not dwell on its details here. The Court, in a
wide range of First Amendment disputes, has foresworn any emphasis
on equalizing expressive access and enriching public debate, instead
equating speech with property and thus insulating the economic market's
prepolitical distribution of expressive opportunities.4 a Under present
First Amendment doctrine, mass media owners may refuse to sell
advertising space to political speakers; 49 owners of shopping malls may
ban speakers who seek the access to public audiences that the public
square once provided; 50 the wealthy face few constraints in crowding

society"); Owen M. Fiss, State Activism and State Censorship, 100 YALE L.J. 2087 (1991)
[hereinafter Fiss, State Activism] (applying Barron's suggestion of judicial oversight, rather than
pure regulation, to the exercise of state-sponsored censorship in its various forms); Owen M. Fiss,
Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781, 791 (1987) [hereinafter Fiss, Why the State?] (stating that
"[t]he courts are part of the state ... but they are likely to achieve a greater measure of
independence than the legislature or administrative agencies").
46. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 251
(1993) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY] (positing that "[s]ome forms of apparent government

intervention into free speech processes can actually improve those processes"); Cass R. Sunstein,
Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255 (1992) (same).
47. See Gregory P. Magarian, Substantive Due Process as a Source of Constitutional
Protectionfor Nonpolitical Speech, 90 MINN. L. REV. 247, 254-57 (2005) (discussing parallels
between the period that gave rise to Meiklejohn's First Amendment theory and post-2001 period).
48. For a detailed account of the Court's expressive access decisions, see Gregory P.
Magarian, The Jurisprudence of Colliding First Amendment Interests: From the Dead End of
Neutrality to the Open Road of Participation Enhancing Review, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
(forthcoming 2007) [hereinafter Magarian, Colliding Interests].
49. Compare Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973)
(rejecting political advertisers' First Amendment claim of right to purchase advertising), with Red
Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding statutorily authorized right of reply
requirement and emphasizing public's interest in balanced information). For further discussion, see
Magarian, Colliding Interests,supra note 48, at 11-14.
50. Compare Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (rejecting First Amendment right of
access to shopping center), with Amalgamated Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S.
308 (1968) (announcing First Amendment right of access to shopping center). For further
discussion, see Magarian, CollidingInterests, supra note 48.
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more modestly funded voices out of electoral discourse; 5' and copyright
holders face only minimal statutory constraints in barring incorporation
of their intellectual property into new creations. 52 All of these rejections
of access rights reflect the Court's disregard for the interests of socially
marginalized, disaggregated, and underfinanced would-be speakers-the
bearers of access rights claims-and solicitude for the interests of
53
powerful institutional speakers-the targets of access rights claims.
Those priorities, in turn, reflect the Court's rejection of a free speech
theory focused on advancing the public's interest in informative,
inclusive democratic discourse in favor of a theory focused on protecting
empowered speakers' autonomy against government interference.5 4
The Court has employed two primary doctrinal strategies to
dispense with access rights claims.55 In cases that squarely present the
question whether the First Amendment guarantees some measure of
access to means of expression, the Justices deny the existence of access
rights as anathema to the First Amendment. 56 In cases where access
issues arise as matters of legislative or regulatory discretion, the Court
typically submerges the constitutional dimension of the problem and
51. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). For further discussion, see
Magarian, Colliding Interests, supra note 48.
52. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). For further discussion, see Magarian,
Colliding Interests, supra note 48.
53. See Gregory P. Magarian, The Pragmatic Populism of Justice Stevens's Free Speech
Jurisprudence, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2201, 2204-06 (2006). The Court still shows occasional
concern for the interests of marginalized and underfinanced speakers, although Justice Stevens
stands alone in making that concern a priority. See id. at 2212-27.
54. See Gregory P. Magarian, Regulating Political Parties Under a "Public Rights " First
Amendment, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1939, 1951-52 (2003) (discussing Court's shift toward
autonomy-based First Amendment theory) [hereinafter Magarian, Political Parties].
55. In a broad sense, we might view free speech doctrine generally as a regime of access
rights because the First Amendment requires people adversely affected by speech to bear its costs.
See Frederick Schauer, Uncoupling Free Speech, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1321, 1322 (1992) (arguing
that "existing understandings of the First Amendment are based on the assumption that, because a
price must be paid for free speech, it must be the victims of harmful speech who are to pay it"). This
redistributive element of free speech law appears most clearly in the public forum doctrine, to the
extent the Court requires the public to dedicate its property to the expressive uses of people without
access to private expressive property. Theorists on all sides of the access rights debate, however,
appear to agree that judicially mandated access to privately held expressive property would entail a
distinctive change in present First Amendment doctrine. See, e.g., Richard B. Saphire,
Reconsidering the Public Forum Doctrine, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 739, 739 n.2 (1999) (distinguishing
between speech in the public forum and "speech on privately owned property or places," which
under existing First Amendment doctrine is "within the control of the property owner, subject, of
course, to the general law of property applicable in a particular jurisdiction").
56. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 520-21 (1976) (rejecting right of access to
expressive property); Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 122-23,
129-30 (1973) (rejecting right of access to media).
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defers to the elected branches. 57 These twin strategies of denial and
deference 58 roughly correspond with, and reflect the influence of, the
two principal theoretical critiques of access rights-the libertarian
critique, which opposes access rights on constitutional principle, and the
regulatory reform critique, which embraces access reforms but opposes
judicial recourse to the First Amendment as a basis for expanding
access. The bulk of this Article will address those two critiques.
One circumstance that might obviate the need for any theoretical
critique of access rights is the ongoing revolution in information
technology. The explosion of online communication over the past fifteen
years has triggered a wave of technological optimism, which has led
many theorists to proclaim that cyberspace will ameliorate the
communicative inequalities that inspired Barron to advocate access
rights. 59 If the technological optimists are right, the open-ended character
of online communication-the easy ability of anyone with a computer
and an Internet connection to join public debate-will by itself ensure
the representation in public debate of every variety of speaker and
perspective present in the body politic. Although the technological
optimist argument does not brand Barron's case for access rights
constitutionally out of bounds or institutionally ill-advised,6 ° it does
suggest a basis for shrugging off access rights as irrelevant. The Court

57. See PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (upholding against First
Amendment challenge a provision of the California constitution providing for right of access to
shopping centers); Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 453 U.S. at 397 (upholding against First Amendment
challenge a federal regulatory requirement that broadcasters sell advertising time to political
candidates).
58. See generally Magarian, Colliding Interests, supra note 48 (examining Court's use of
denial and deference techniques in expressive access cases).
59. See, e.g., Allen S. Hammond, IV, Regulating Broadband Communication Networks, 9
YALE J. ON REG. 181, 190-92 (1992); John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of Independence of
Cyberspace (Feb. 8, 1996), http://homes.eff.org/-barlow/Declaration-Final.html.
60. Various proponents of the libertarian and regulatory reform critiques of access rights
incorporate technological optimism into their arguments. See MARTIN H. REDISH, MONEY TALKS:
SPEECH, ECONOMIC POWER, AND THE VALUES OF DEMOCRACY 190-92 (2001); Jack M. Balkin,

Commentaries, DigitalSpeech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expressionfor the
Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 2-9 (2004) [hereinafter Balkin, Digital Speech]; Charles
Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence:A Threat to Liberty, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 225, 252
(1992); John 0. McGinnis, The Once and FutureProperty-Based Vision of the FirstAmendment, 63
U. CHI. L. REV. 49, 100-31 (1996); Kathleen M. Sullivan, FirstAmendment Intermediaries in the
Age of Cyberspace, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1653, 1666-69, 1671 (1998) [hereinafter Sullivan,
Intermediaries]; Christopher S. Yoo, The Rise and Demise of the Technology-Specific Approach to
the FirstAmendment, 91 GEO. L.J. 245, 344-45 (2003) [hereinafter Yoo, Rise and Demise].
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occasionally has prefigured this argument by invoking technological
distinctions among media to reject access claims. 6'
A thorough critique of the technological optimist position lies
beyond the scope of this Article. I simply offer a few observations about
why Barron's case for access rights transcends recent and foreseeable
developments in information technology. Barron's argument, as
described above, implicates three distinct problems with the mass
media: that the cost of entry to media discourse excludes many speakers
from participating, and thus prevents many ideas from circulating; that,
accordingly, private concentrations of wealth and power control media
access to a socially detrimental extent; and that the mass media generally
fail to contribute to public debate socially valuable discussions of
important issues from a wide range of perspectives. I will call these the
cost, concentration, and contribution premises of the case for access
rights. Even in our age of burgeoning information technology, one or
more of these three premises will remain relevant for the foreseeable
future, ensuring the continued vitality of Barron's case for access rights.
The media premise of the case for access rights that the Internet
most obviously affects is cost. Anyone with access to a computer-and
fewer people every day fall outside that category63-knows that the
Internet has created unprecedented, undeniable, and welcome
opportunities for ordinary people of modest means to communicate with
mass audiences. Even that cornerstone of technological optimists'
disregard for access rights, however, has two plainly visible cracks.
First, traditional mass media, such as the major broadcast networks,
commercial radio stations, and urban daily newspapers, still exert
tremendous influence over public debate.64 Continuing developments in
online communication will, albeit to an unpredictable extent, further
marginalize the traditional media. Historical experience, however,
suggests the new medium will never completely eradicate the old ones.
All of television's technological innovation has never fully supplanted

61. Compare, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 387-90 (1969) (citing scarcity
of broadcast spectrum as the ground for upholding broadcast access regulation), with Turner Broad.
Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637-40 (1994) (rejecting Red Lion scarcity rationale as basis for
justifying cable television access requirement).
62. See supra Part II.A.
63. See Seth F. Kreimer, Technologies of Protest: Insurgent Social Movements and the First
Amendment in the Era of the Internet, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 119, 140-42 (2001) (describing narrowing

of the "digital divide").
64. See Balkin, Digital Speech, supra note 60, at 10 (noting that "traditional mass
media ... still play a crucial role in setting agendas because they still provide the lion's share of
news and information to most people").

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2007

13

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 3 [2007], Art. 13
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:1373

newspapers, magazines, and the radio. Faced with the opportunity to
absorb information passively from a screen, some people, some of the
time, still prefer active perusal of the printed page. In the same way, the
Internet's customizable interactivity appears to make some people, some
of the time, appreciate television's prepackaged mass appeal. Second,
even the Internet has already evolved to reward aspects of
communication-such as sophisticated graphics, highly interactive
features, and the ability to receive prime position from search enginesthat require substantial resources.6 5 This phenomenon reflects
competition for scarce audience attention in a world of virtually limitless
information. 66
The possibility that high costs of entry to significant public debates
may persist even in cyberspace also implicates the second media premise
of the case for access rights-concentration. Although the Internet
presents great possibilities for making communication more egalitarian,
substantial structural inequalities persist in cyberspace. The complex
architecture of online communication is not some state of nature; rather,
it is a construct whose functions and attributes will always depend on the
regulatory constraints that both governments and nongovernmental
authorities impose on it. 67 The Internet, like traditional mass media,
gives powerful access providers ample opportunities and strong
incentives to consolidate their power by creating communication
bottlenecks. 68 The same economic factors that have produced
concentration and undermined diversity in the traditional mass media

65. See C. Edwin Baker, Media Concentration: Giving Up on Democracy, 54 FLA. L. REV.
839, 897-99 (2002) [hereinafter Baker, Media Concentration] (discussing economic factors that
could facilitate corporate dominance of online media); Ellen P. Goodman, Media Policy Out of the
Box: Content Abundance, Attention Scarcity, and the Failures of Digital Markets, 19 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1389, 1453 (2004) (noting that "the benefits of scale and incumbency will continue to
exist in the digital world").
66. See Kreimer, supra note 63, at 142-43 (describing relationship between "digital attention
deficit" and increased expense of online communication).
67. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 43-44 (1999); see also
Baker, Media Concentration, supra note 65, at 896 (emphasizing that Intemet merely distributes
content and carries no guarantee about the diversity or nature of content it distributes); Eben
Moglen, The Invisible Barbecue, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 945, 945-47 (1997) (criticizing
Telecommunications Act of 1996 for favoring concentrated private interests rather than general
public in regulation of information technology); Margaret Jane Radin, Property Evolving in
Cyberspace, 15 J.L. & COM. 509, 523-26 (1996) (describing the Internet's amenability to regulatory
control and expressing doubt about unfettered market's ability to produce an open, competitive
Intemet).
68. See C. EDWIN BAKER, MEDIA, MARKETS, AND DEMOCRACY 295-96 (2002) (discussing
possibilities for online bottlenecks).
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have carried over in substantial measure to cyberspace. 69 The Internet's
seemingly egalitarian diversity of content actually facilitates
consolidation, by generating a process of preference-reinforcement that
inclines audiences to focus on a relatively small percentage of available
content.7 0 Whether the future Internet will look more concentrated or
more disaggregated remains a very open question.
Finally, even in the technological optimists' best of all possible
worlds-where the Internet fully supplants traditional mass media and
everyone has an equal share in controlling it-the contribution premise
for access rights retains its salience. The contribution premise is more
obviously normative than the other two because it values communication
about particular subject matter-issues of substantial public concern-as
well as diversity of perspectives and participants in debate. No one can
confidently predict whether even a highly disaggregated system of
online communication will exceed traditional mass media in fostering
discussion of public issues and bringing marginalized voices into public
discourse. The culprit, once again, is scarcity of audience attention.
Although online content providers can produce endless quantities of
information, audiences may expend their time available for Internet
consumption before alighting on any matter of public concern. 7' Those
unmoved by the normative priorities underlying the case for access
rights tend to brand any critique of audiences' market choices
paternalistic.

72

However, even assuming paternalism in this context is

69. See id. at 285-307 (thoroughly analyzing economic features of online communication and
concluding that Internet has not ameliorated problems with market distributions of media access);
Goodman, supra note 65, at 1453-54 (noting traditional media powerhouses' success in transferring
their dominance to Internet).
70. See Clay Shirky's Writings About the Internet, Power Laws, Weblogs, and Inequality,
http://www.shirky.com/writings/powerlaw-weblog.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2007).
71. For discussions of the relationship between attention scarcity and underproduction of
information about matters of public concern, see BAKER, supra note 68, at 289 (noting that
technology's dispersion of audience attention complicates production of "many culturally or
politically valuable media contents"); Goodman, supra note 65, at 1455-61 (identifying attention
deficit and diminished quality of attention as factors of digital communication technology that
discourage production of information valuable for democratic deliberation); Moglen, supra note 67,
at 952-53 (indicting commodification of human attention as generating "media designed to force
images and information at us, rather than to respond to our requests"); Radin, supra note 67, at 517
("In a world where attention is property, noncommodified political and social ideas and interactions
may wither.").
72. See infra notes 85-93 and accompanying text (discussing libertarian view that market
distributions of expressive opportunities accurately reflect individual preferences). For discussion of
that argument's empirical and normative failings, see infra Part III.C.
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out of bounds,73 the online audience's apparent "choice" to disdain
political debate might actually reflect content providers' disincentive to
produce information with broad, collective benefits rather than
precision-guided appeal.
The Internet's distinctive architecture makes implementation of any
online access rights regime a complicated proposition, requiring nuanced
technological, as well as legal, insights.74 The Internet does not,
however, obviate the problems of cost, concentration, and contribution
that plague existing mass media and animate Barron's case for access
rights. I now turn to the deeper questions that generate the two principal
critiques of access rights: whether a proper understanding of the First
Amendment precludes any government effort to broaden access to the
means of expression, and if not, whether a proper understanding of
institutional arrangements within government marks the elected
branches, and not the judiciary, as the proper source of those reforms.

III.

THE LIBERTARIAN CRITIQUE OF ACCESS RIGHTS

The decline of academic arguments for First Amendment access
rights roughly corresponds with the collapse of the Soviet empire. The
fall of the Berlin Wall has inspired a surge in free-market triumphalism,
unmatched since the Industrial Revolution, which infers from the
collapse of Soviet-style totalitarian states a complete vindication of
laissez-faire

capitalism.

75

This

market

triumphalism

helps

to

contextualize, and ultimately indict, the first of two principal intellectual
critiques of access rights: the libertarian critique.76 The first section of
73. Cass Sunstein contends that such "paternalistic" policy initiatives actually can amount to
"the people, acting in their capacity as citizens, . . . attempting to implement aspirations that diverge
from their consumption choices." SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supranote 46, at 74.
74. Ellen Goodman offers a technologically and architecturally sophisticated proposal focused
on the value of targeted government subsidies in an environment of plentiful information and scarce
audience attention. See Goodman, supra note 65, at 1461-67. For an alternative proposal with more
aggressive regulatory components, see CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 167-90 (2001). Goodman's
proposal, in my view, makes a great deal of sense on its own terms, although her analysis overstates
the force of First Amendment impediments to more proactive regulation. See Goodman, supra note
65, at 1462-64. Conversely, some of Sunstein's prescriptions, such as requiring any opinionated
Web site to provide links to opposing points of view, see SUNSTEIN, supra, at 186-87, overreach
even a public rights conception of the First Amendment while also taking insufficient account of
technological and architectural challenges.
75. See generally THOMAS FRANK, ONE MARKET UNDER GOD: EXTREME CAPITALISM,
MARKET POPULISM, AND THE END OF ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY (2000) (discussing, in part, the

economic implications of the collapse of Communism).
76. Not all of the critics discussed in this Article respond directly to Barron's case for media
access rights. Most of them criticize access rights alongside other regulatory proposals, including
bans on hate speech and pornography, and some address ideas, such as campaign finance regulation,
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this part presents the conservative libertarian version of that critique,
marked by an autonomy-centered theory of the First Amendment, an

insistence upon economic market distributions of expressive
opportunities, and a conviction that any deviation from a laissez-faire
First Amendment amounts to censorship bordering on tyranny. The

second section discusses a seemingly more moderate articulation of the
libertarian critique, the progressive libertarian version. Although
progressive libertarian theorists express sympathy with the egalitarian
and democratic concerns that animate calls for access rights and offer
more nuanced analyses of free speech issues, my discussion reveals that
they echo all three of the conservative libertarians' major chords. The
final section contends that the rigid constitutional commitment to
markets that defines both versions of the libertarian critique collapses
under empirical, theoretical, and normative problems.
A.

The Conservative Libertarian Version

The libertarian critique
emerges most predictably and
straightforwardly from a group I will call conservative libertarians,
which includes Charles Fried,77 Steven Gey, 7 8 John McGinnis, 79 and
Christopher Yoo. 80 These theorists' arguments against access rights,
although varied in approach and emphasis, make three common claims.
First, they all embrace an exclusively autonomy-focused theory of
expressive freedom. The conservative libertarians proceed from a
theoretical premise, grounded in classical liberalism, that the First

Amendment provides nothing more than negative protection for
speakers' autonomy against government regulation. 8 1 This autonomy-

that fall within a broader conception of access rights. My discussion addresses arguments that either
respond to access rights proposals or contribute to the critic's opposition to access rights.
77. See Fried, supra note 60. Fried attacks access rights alongside distinct proposals by
critical race and feminist theorists to alter First Amendment doctrine. Id. at 250-53. My discussion
is limited to his arguments against access rights.
78. See Steven G. Gey, The Case Against Postmodern Censorship Theory, 145 U. PA. L. REV.
193 (1996). Gey as well attacks critical race and feminist proposals in addition to access rights. My
discussion addresses only his treatment of access rights, which primarily targets Cass Sunstein. See
id. at 255-80. For Sunstein's view on access rights, see generally SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra
note 46.
79. See McGinnis, supra note 60.
80. See Christopher S. Yoo, Architectural Censorship and the FCC, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 669
(2005) [hereinafter Yoo, Architectural Censorship]; Yoo, Rise and Demise, supra note 60.
81. See Fried, supra note 60, at 233 ("Freedom of expression is properly based on
autonomy ....
); Gey, supra note 78, at 232 (comparing unfavorably an egalitarian free speech
regime to one that "attempts to allocate to nongovemment actors the right to choose their particular
worldview and make their own basic decisions about social values"); McGinnis, supra note 60, at
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driven approach to First Amendment theory serves the normative
political theory of interest group pluralism, which holds that democratic
societies properly distribute social goods through a process of conflict
among groups of self-interested utility maximizers. 82 Conservative
libertarians seek First Amendment protection for speakers' autonomy so
that communication can facilitate those conflicts in the political sphere
and, more importantly, market exchanges in the private sphere.83 Fried
exemplifies this approach when he describes communication as "a
that free speech law protects from
transaction between citizens"
84
collective interference.
Second, conservative libertarians oppose access rights because, for
them, the market's allocation of expressive opportunities defines
distributive justice, and thus any "information-producing property" 85 is
protected speech. McGinnis explicitly identifies speech as a property
right. 86 Fried celebrates private rights as "indifferent-blessedly-to the
ideological uses to which their beneficiaries would put them,, 87 and Gey
similarly portrays the absence of government regulation as "neutralitywhich entails the protection of individual privacy and intellectual

57 (positing expressive freedom as "rooted in the natural rights of the individual"); Yoo, Rise and
Demise, supra note 60, at 316 (positing that analysis of democracy-based approaches to free speech
"turns largely on their ability to come to grips with.., autonomy-based visions of free speech").
82. See Magarian, Political Parties, supra note 54, at 1953 (describing correspondence
between autonomy-based First Amendment theories and interest group pluralism).
83. See Gey, supra note 78, at 262-64 n.212, 271-72 (arguing for superiority of interest group
pluralism over civic republican political theory); McGinnis, supra note 60, at 53-55 (asserting that
proper understanding of expressive freedom turns on insights of public choice theory and economic
theories of communication); Yoo, Architectural Censorship, supra note 80, at 673 (basing
constitutional analysis of media policy on economic analysis of media markets).
84. Fried, supra note 60, at 236. McGinnis likewise seeks "to cleanse the First Amendment of
the obscuring varnish of social democracy and reveal its true origins as a property right of the
individual, thus providing a model for an emerging laissez-faire jurisprudence." McGinnis, supra
note 60, at 56. He derives this economically driven approach to expressive freedom from a
biological premise that "the human faculty of speech evolved to improve economic well-being." Id.
at 55. He further asserts, based on the premise that "civic understanding in a democracy is
inevitably limited," that democratic principles are inappropriate not only in First Amendment
adjudication but also in "other areas of social life." Id. at 126 n.320.
85. McGinnis, supra note 60, at 93-94.
86. See generally id. (arguing that Framers' intent and economic theory require a propertybased view of the First. Amendment). On this basis, McGinnis finds a parallel between the Court's
application of deferential First Amendment scrutiny to cable "must carry" requirements and the
French Revolution. See McGinnis, supra note 60, at 117-18 (discussing Turner Broad. Corp. v.
FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994)); see also Fried, supra note 60, at 230 (comparing access rights
advocates to "Jacobins").
87. Fried, supra note 60, at 234-35 n.47 (discussing "background systems" of tort, property,
and criminal law).
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autonomy. ,,88 Yoo likewise dismisses concerns about distributive justice
as irrelevant to First Amendment analysis. 89 These theorists presume
choices unconstrained by direct government regulation to be freely made
and thus immune to structural criticism. 90 Therefore, the existing market
distribution of expressive opportunities, by definition, accurately reflects
the will of the people. 9 1 Because conservative libertarians ascribe

absolute legitimacy to market distributions, the mere possibility that an
access rights regime might have disadvantages or might fail to achieve

its aims suffices to condemn it. 92 Conversely, conservative libertarians
dismiss concerns about nongovernmental suppression of expression by
invoking a rigid public-private distinction, which denies corporations
and other private entities any legally cognizable capacity to undermine
expressive freedom. 93 Any attempt to ameliorate privately driven
constraints on expression runs aground on the twinned convictions that
government can only harm expressive freedom and that only
government can harm expressive freedom.

88. Gey, supra note 78, at 261.
89. See Yoo, Architectural Censorship, supra note 80, at 687 n.65; see also id. at 689-90, 715
n.209 (suggesting that regulatory attempts to ensure diverse viewpoints in public debate violate the
First Amendment).
90. See Gey, supra note 78, at 212 (attacking idea that "individual preferences.., evolve as
they adapt to new social conditions"); McGinnis, supra note 60, at 100 (characterizing Internet as
"an example of spontaneous order" because it results from decisions "without the central direction
of the state"); Yoo, Rise and Demise, supra note 60, at 318-19 (proclaiming any questioning of
process by which market influences preference formation "fundamentally inconsistent with most
democratic forms of government"). Fried acknowledges the existence of nongovernmental
constraints on autonomy but presumes that "[o]ther legal norms" outside the Constitution eliminate
those constraints. Fried, supra note 60, at 234-35.
91. See Fried, supra note 60, at 251-52 & n.205 (arguing that any underrepresentation in
public debate of "opinions on the left" must mean those ideas are "boring" and "unconvincing");
Gey, supra note 78, at 265 (claiming that access rights arguments merely reflect the fact that "most
of the public has used its existing freedom to reject or ignore ... favored programming in favor of
other, less enlightening alternatives"); Yoo, Architectural Censorship, supra note 80, at 675-713
(using economic analysis to deny existence of"market failures" in broadcasting).
92. See Gey, supra note 78, at 224 (arguing against access rights based on the possibility that
they might "do more harm than good"); McGinnis, supra note 60, at 123 (discussing practical
advantages of market over "centralized authority"); Yoo, Rise and Demise, supra note 60, at 324-41
(discussing potential problems with implementing access rights).
93. See Fried, supra note 60, at 234 (stating that "[p]rivate impositions and limitations differ
fundamentally from state impositions" because "they issue from the limiting person's own exercise
of liberty"); Gey, supra note 78, at 242 (asserting that "the public/private distinction" and "some
separation between the governors and the governed" is necessary to democracy); Yoo, Architectural
Censorship, supra note 80, at 715 n.207 (dismissing concerns about private suppression of
expression with conclusory statement that "the state action doctrine ... represents one of the central
underpinnings of classic liberal theory").
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Third, conservative libertarians' equation of the economic market
with freedom leads them to equate any effort to create a more egalitarian
distribution of expressive opportunities with tyrannical state interference
in the proper working of the market. Gey and Yoo, beginning with their
article titles, repeatedly indict access rights as "censorship. 9 4 Gey
situates access rights advocates among a class of "postmodern censors"
who "would reinstitute a degree of government control over speech and
thought.., so that the government could mold political reality to its own
liking., 95 Fried dredges up an especially pungent comparison, likening
access rights advocates to "socialists" ' 96 and "apologists for Marxism-

Leninism." 97 Conservative libertarians dismiss as a fabrication the
portrayal of access rights as a substantively neutral effort to encourage
presentation of a wide range of viewpoints. 98 Rather, they see access
rights as a means to force a specifically left-wing political agenda upon
an unsuspecting people. 99 Fried, warming to his Cold War theme,
portrays the case for access rights as "an argument for censorship... to
avoid the competition, in much the spirit that East European television
used to jam Western broadcasts of 'Dallas."°°

94. See Gey, supra note 78; Yoo, Architectural Censorship, supra note 80. Indeed, Yoo's
conception of "censorship" extends beyond access rights to any government action, such as the
choice to promote advertiser-supported broadcasting and restrictions on ownership of media
enterprises, which has the result of altering market distributions of expressive opportunities. See
Yoo, Architectural Censorship,supra note 80, at 685 (discussing advertiser-supported broadcasting
model); see also id. at 700-01 (discussing horizontal ownership restrictions); id. at 712-13
(discussing vertical ownership restrictions). McGinnis similarly sees any regulation specifically
directed at information-producing property as a presumptive First Amendment violation. See
McGinnis, supranote 60, at 116 & n.285 (criticizing media ownership restrictions).
95. Gey, supra note 78, at 198; see also id. at 260 (ascribing to access rights advocates the
"Orwellian" notion that "restriction equals freedom"); id. at 269 ("[S]peech regulations are

proposed as a means of permanently altering the thought patterns of the citizens living under the
control of the government.").

96. Fried, supra note 60, at 251.
97. Id. at 252.
98. See id. at 251 (claiming that access rights arguments based on "self-government and
support for the fullest measure of public controversy... are not arguments that we can take
seriously").
99. See Gey, supra note 78, at 231-32 (claiming that access rights would create an "elitist"
regime); McGinnis, supra note 60, at 122 n.304 (asserting that "many academics on the left favor
regulation despite th[e] growth of information sources because of their growing realization that most
of the truths emerging from contemporary social inquiry are not hospitable to collectivist and
egalitarian ideals"); Yoo, Architectural Censorship, supra note 80, at 674 n.13 (suggesting that
structural media regulations mask intent to control media content).
100. Fried, supra note 60, at 252.
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B.

The ProgressiveLibertarianVersion

More compelling, for anyone not normatively committed to
unregulated market control of expression, is the critique offered by what
I will call progressive libertarian opponents of access rights, notably
Robert Post, Martin Redish, and Kathleen Sullivan. These theorists,

unlike the conservative libertarians, share the normative concern of
Barron and other access rights advocates about inequality in the
distribution of expressive opportunities or deficits in the quality of
public debate. Sullivan acknowledges the relevance of distributive
concerns to First Amendment doctrine. 10 1 Post abhors "the inequalities
that afflict our contemporary media [and] the many ways in which the
quality of our public discourse is undercut by the skew of market
forces," 10 2 and he credits access rights advocates with "a sincere and

admirable effort to rejuvenate democratic self-governance."'0 3 Redish,
although generally suspicious of redistributive impulses,' 0 4 seems to
acknowledge the desirability of "enriching public debate by including
the expression of those who normally lack communicative access to the
public at large."' 0 5 Despite their normative sympathies, however, the
progressive libertarians reject as a constitutional matter any public
initiative to broaden access to the means of expression, viewing
arguments for access rights as misguided egalitarian attacks on the
laudable status quo that Sullivan labels "progressive free speech
libertarianism."' 06

101. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, J. Byron McCormick Lecture, Discrimination,Distributionand
Free Speech, 37 ARIz. L. REV. 439, 450 (1995) [hereinafter Sullivan, Discrimination].
102. Robert Post, Equality and Autonomy in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 95 MICH. L.
REV. 1517, 1538 (1997) (reviewing FiSS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED, supra note 45) [hereinafter Post,

Equality and Autonomy].
103. Robert Post, Meiklejohn's Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public
Discourse,64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1124 (1993) [hereinafter Post, Meiklejohn 's Mistake].
104. See REDISH, supra note 60, at 153-60 (critiquing theoretical bases for redistribution).
105. Id. at 191.
106. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Free Speech Wars, 48 SMU L. REV. 203, 213 (1994) [hereinafter
Sullivan, Free Speech Wars]; see also REDISH, supra note 60, at 152 (praising traditional
understanding of First Amendment); Post, Equality and Autonomy, supra note 102, at 1539-40
(favorably contrasting "the free speech tradition" with arguments for access rights); Sullivan, Free
Speech Wars, supra, at 206-09 (favorably describing the "modem free speech consensus"). Post has
at times strongly criticized conventional First Amendment doctrine, albeit in terms that do not
undermine his libertarian perspective on access rights. See Robert Post, Essay, Recuperating First
Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1270 (1995); Robert C. Post, The Constitutional
Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler
Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601, 678-79 (1990) (describing doctrinal failures related to
the concept of public discourse) [hereinafter Post, Outrageous Opinion].
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The progressive libertarians' objections to access rights spring from
far more nuanced accounts of expressive freedom than the
conservatives' unvarnished market triumphalism. Sullivan argues that
differences between economic goods and speech justify perpetuating the
constitutional asymmetry between the permissibility of economic
regulations and the impermissibility of speech regulations. 10 7 Redish
critiques access rights within the broad framework of redistributive
theory,108 and he draws a damning comparison between access rights and
impermissible compulsion of expression.10 9 Post's theory of expressive
freedom rests on an eloquent account of a functioning democratic
society's need for open, robust communication.' 10 He indicts access
rights as compromising essential First Amendment protection for his
conception of public discourse, in which "democracy attempts to
reconcile individual autonomy with collective self-determination by
subordinating governmental decisionmaking to communicative
processes sufficient to instill in citizens a sense of participation,
legitimacy, and identification."'1 1 All of these conceptions of expressive
freedom appeal to the same democratic values that animate the case for
access rights, and none openly venerates the economic market's
distribution of expressive opportunities.
In addition to the nuanced rhetoric of their First Amendment
theories, the progressive libertarians distance their attacks on access
rights from those of the conservative libertarians by emphasizing what
they portray as an internal contradiction in the case for access rights. All
of the progressive libertarian theorists seek to drive a conceptual wedge
between the two central goals of access rights: better public information
and broader democratic participation'112 Redish posits the asserted
dichotomy in the clearest terms, distinguishing "equality" of political
participation from "enrichment" of public debate as justifications for
access rights. 1 13 Post distinguishes between justifications for access

107.
65 (1995)
108.
109.
110.
111.

See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Free Speech and Unfree Markets, 42 UCLA L. REV. 949, 959[hereinafter Sullivan, Unfree Markets].
See REDISH, supra note 60, at153-74.
See id. at 174-84.
For a useful introduction, see Post, Outrageous Opinion, supra note 106, at 626-46.
Robert Post, Meiklejohn's Mistake, supra note 103, at 1115-16. For further development

of Post's concept of public discourse, see Robert Post, Democracy and Equality, 603 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. Sci. 24, 25-30 (2006) [hereinafter Post, Democracy]; Post, Outrageous
Opinion, supra note 106, at 633-38.
112. See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text (deriving information and participation
goals from Barron's case for access rights).
113. See REDISH, supra note 60, at 161-68 (discussing equality and enrichment rationales).
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rights that cast the state as "parliamentarian" and "teacher." ' 1 4 Sullivan
likewise distinguishes "allocative" from "distributive or paternalistic"
justifications. '15 This claimed discontinuity between improving
informational quality and broadening participation enables the
progressive libertarians to argue that access rights could improve public
debate only if accompanied by unacceptably elitist substantive
prescriptions. 1 6 Attacking the internal dynamics of the case for access
rights enables the progressive libertarians to reject access rights without
appearing to reject the normative priorities that access rights seek to
advance.
Behind their nuanced accounts of free speech and distinctive
internal objections to access rights, however, the progressive libertarians
actually embrace-as a constitutional if not a normative matter-all of
the conservative libertarians' central precepts. First, the progressive
libertarians echo the conservative libertarian dogma that the First
Amendment serves only to protect personal autonomy against
government interference. Redish has constructed an imposing structure
of First Amendment theory on the premise that constitutional speech
protection exists solely to protect "individual self-realization."' ' 7 He
especially recalls the conservative libertarians in focusing First
Amendment protection on property used for expression-in his phrase,8
"the associational enterprise that operates the expressive resource.""11
Sullivan praises "[c]onventional First Amendment norms of
individualism, relativism, and antipaternalism" and maintains that First9
Amendment principles preclude a norm of "equality of influence.""
Both Redish and Sullivan join the conservative libertarians in painting a

114. See Post, Equality and Autonomy, supra note 102, at 1528-34; see also Robert C. Post,
Essay, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 187-90 (1996) [hereinafter Post, Subsidized Speech]
(recapitulating argument in government subsidy context).
115. Sullivan, Unfree Markets, supra note 107, at 956-57.
116. Jack Balkin posits a similar dichotomy, although without a libertarian agenda, when he
distinguishes populist and progressive tendencies in First Amendment thought. See J.M. Balkin,
Populism and Progressivism as ConstitutionalCategories, 104 YALE L.J. 1935 (1995) [hereinafter
Balkin, Populism] (reviewing SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 46).

117. See generally Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591
(1982) (arguing that free speech ultimately serves one true value: "individual self-realization," a
term used to include both "liberty" and "autonomy" on the one hand, and "individual selffulfillment" or "human development" on the other).
118. REDISH, supra note 60, at 182 (footnote omitted). Redish argues that the First Amendment
should protect expressive property even when the owner has "no substantive message to convey
[but is] interested primarily or exclusively in maximizing profits." Id. at 189.
119.

Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.

663, 673 (1997) [hereinafter Sullivan, PoliticalMoney].
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favorable picture of interest group pluralism as a democratic model. 2 °
Post suggests a different theoretical orientation by characterizing his
First Amendment theory as aimed at facilitating democratic selfdetermination, 12 ' but he conceptualizes democratic process values in a
way that subordinates them to an unyielding principle of autonomy.
"Individual citizens," he explains, "can identify with the creation of a
collective will only if they believe that collective decisionmaking is 1in
22
some way connected to their own individual self-determination.',
enterprise of public discourse.., rests on the
Thus, he concludes, 1"[t]he
23
value of autonomy."'
Second, and centrally, the progressive libertarians echo, albeit in
subtler tones, the conservative libertarians' belief in the market as the
only constitutionally legitimate arbiter of expressive opportunities. Post
strikingly rejects doubts about key premises of market distribution-the
public-private distinction and the autonomous character of individual
choices-not because he can defend either premise on its own terms but
because he cannot conceptualize democratic self-determination without
presuming them. 24 "The ascription of autonomy," he writes, is "the
transcendental precondition for the possibility of democratic selfdetermination."'' 25 Accordingly, he condemns as anathema to democracy
any regulatory effort to alter market distributions. 26 Redish maintains
that the unregulated market gives all competing ideas a fair opportunity
to influence debate and insists that altering the market's distribution of
expressive opportunities in any way would contradict the terms of
120. See REDISH, supra note 60, at 171-72; Sullivan, PoliticalMoney, supra note 119, at 68082. For discussion of the conservative libertarian rejection of civic republican ideas in favor of
interest group pluralism, see supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
121. See Post, Equality and Autonomy, supra note 102, at 1521.
122. Id. at 1524; see also Post, Democracy, supra note 111, at 26 (arguing that "the practice of
self-government" turns not on "making particular decisions" but rather on "recognizing particular
decisions as one's own").
123. Post, Meiklejohn's Mistake, supra note 103, at 1118-19; see also Post, Equality and
Autonomy, supra note 102, at 1530 (emphasizing "the principle that the self-determining agency of
all persons should be regarded with equal respect" as basis for rejecting efforts to equalize the
distribution of expressive opportunities).
124. See Post, Meiklejohn's Mistake, supra note 103, at 1125-28 (discussing public-private
distinction); id. at 1128-33 (discussing autonomous character of individual choices). Post's assertion
that our deepening social science knowledge about cultural influences on behavior "is deeply
incompatible with the very premise of democratic self-government," id. at 1130, resonates with
McGinnis' similar doubt about the sustainability of democratic values. See supranote 84.
125. Post, Meiklejohn 's Mistake, supra note 103, at 1131 (emphasis added).
126. See id. at 1121; see also Post, Equality and Autonomy, supra note 102, at 1530-31
(characterizing access rights as impermissibly "repressing the speech of some in order to augment
the speech of others"); id. at 1537 (charging that, under an access rights regime, "public discourse
could no longer mediate between individual and collective self-determination").
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7
democracy by compromising self-determination. 1 He also emphasizes
a notion of "epistemological humility" that treats market distributions as
inherently legitimate while discrediting any questioning of private power
as an impermissible appeal to "normative factors." 128 Sullivan endorses
market distributions of expressive opportunities by avidly embracing the
public-private distinction. 129 Her avowed "differential distrust of
government" reinforces the idea that the market distributes expressive
opportunities neutrally 130 and that egalitarian reforms would
impermissibly alter that neutral distribution. 3 1 The progressive
libertarians join their conservative counterparts in presuming the
market's distribution of expressive opportunity to be an empirically
reliable measure of people's preferences1 32 while treating any
uncertainty about access rights' efficacy as reason enough to reject

them. 133

Finally, the progressive libertarians echo the conservative
libertarian warning that any attempt to alter the market's distribution of
expressive opportunities amounts to statist tyranny. Too polite to parrot

127. See REDISH, supra note 60, at 163-64. Redish defines "political equality" as requiring
only "governmental neutrality in the restriction of private expression," and he dismisses the idea of
substantive equality as unattainable. Id. at 163.
128. Id. at 170.
129. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Resurrecting Free Speech, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 971, 979-82
(1995) [hereinafter Sullivan, Resurrecting] (defending public-private distinction); see also Sullivan,
Free Speech Wars, supra note 106, at 207 (describing nongovernmental suppressions of speech as
"exercises of editorial discretion, market judgment, social responsibility, or just plain taste").
130. See Sullivan, Unfree Markets, supra note 107, at 961-62.
131. See Sullivan, Free Speech Wars, supra note 106, at 212-13 (critically describing
egalitarian commitments of access rights advocates); see also Sullivan, Political Money, supra note
119, at 675 (describing expressive freedom as "a realm of inevitable inequality").
132. See Post, Equality and Autonomy, supra note 102, at 1536 n.38 (arguing for presumption
of market distributions because "we typically do not have access" to "a perspective that is itself
impervious to social circumstances"); Sullivan, PoliticalMoney, supra note 119, at 677-78 (denying
the possibility of any baseline from which to measure distortion of political preferences); cf supra
notes 85-91 and accompanying text (discussing conservative libertarians' belief that market
distributions accurately reflect preferences).
133. See REDISH, supra note 60, at 165-66 (offering assertion that "[t]he impact of a right of
expressive access on the scope of public debate ... is open to question" as a reason to reject access
rights); Post, Equality and Autonomy, supra note 102, at 1529 (questioning efficacy of regulatory
efforts to improve public discourse); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Against Campaign Finance Reform,
1998 UTAH L. REV. 311, 322 [hereinafter Sullivan, Campaign Finance] (arguing that campaign
finance reform's ineffectuality as a redistributive device renders it impermissibly content-based);
Sullivan, Resurrecting, supra note 129, at 986 (questioning capacity of government regulation to
improve upon socially constructed preconditions for expression); cf supra notes 85-92 and
accompanying text (discussing conservative libertarians' rejection of access rights based on
practical doubts).
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Fried's red-baiting, 134 they nonetheless make clear that access rights
advocates are enemies of freedom. Post claims that "efforts to equalize
influence must involve both the equalization of ideas and the control of
intimate and independent processes by which individuals evaluate ideas"
and would therefore "verge on the tyrannical."''

35

Sullivan characterizes

access rights advocates as seeking authority from the state to "reorder[]
our ideological preferences. 1 36 Redish likewise concludes that an access
rights regime would place the state "in a position to manipulate the flow
of private debate on the basis of predetermined substantive
considerations."' 137 The progressive libertarians join the conservatives in
treating past governmental assaults on expressive freedom as conclusive
proof that government cannot enhance expressive freedom. 38 Redish,
amplifying the conservative libertarian charge that access rights front for
left-wing policy preferences, 3 9 would reject access rights because they
resemble proposals for economic redistribution. 140 Post and Sullivan
sound a variation on this theme, claiming that the deliberative idea of
democracy that undergirds access rights proposals would entrench, in
Sullivan's lwords, "a partisan and controversial substantive conception of
4
speech."'
Both Sullivan and Post nominally hedge their bets by carving out
narrow spaces for permissible regulations related to speech. 142 Sullivan
distinguishes between laws that regulate "the activity of speaking" and
those that regulate "the economic attributes of speaking, or in other
words the literal markets in which ideas are commodified," proclaiming
134. See supra notes 94-100 and accompanying text.
135. Post, Equality and Autonomy, supra note 102, at 1535; see also Post, Meiklejohn's
Mistake, supra note 103, at 1120 (equating access rights with censorship).
136. Sullivan, Resurrecting,supra note 129, at 987.
137. REDISH, supra note 60, at 150.
138. See id. at 172-73 (recounting instances of governmental censorship); Post, Meiklejohn's
Mistake, supra note 103, at 1136 (equating "[s]tate intervention" with "[t]he nightmare vision of
Michel Foucault"); Sullivan, Discrimination,supra note 101, at 450 ("[T]here is good reason in our
free speech history to suspect that discretion (both legislative and judicial) will most frequently be

exercised with a bias toward the governing status quo.").
139. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
140. See REDISH, supra note 60, at 151; see also id. at 168-71 (attempting to discredit access
rights arguments as masking a substantive agenda of economic redistribution).
141.

Sullivan, Discrimination,supra note 101, at 449; see also Post, Meiklejohn's Mistake,

supra note 103, at 1117 (claiming that a deliberative vision of expressive freedom is "ultimately
grounded upon a distinctive and controversial conception of collective identity"); Sullivan,
Campaign Finance,supra note 133, at 323 (arguing that justifying campaign finance reform on
democratic process principles violates the First Amendment).
142. Redish sticks to his hard line, considering but rejecting out of hand several narrower
versions of access rights. See REDISH, supra note 60, at 184-90. His sole answer to failings in the
system of free expression is the promise of the Internet. See id. at 190-92.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol35/iss3/13

26

Magarian: Market Triumphalism, Electoral Pathologies, and the Abiding Wisdo
2007]

MARKET TRIUMPHALISM

143
the latter sort of regulation unproblematic under the First Amendment.
Accordingly, she endorses media cross-ownership restrictions 144 and
"must carry" requirements imposed on cable systems. 145 Post suggests
that the government "might perhaps" treat some broadcast media as
quasi-state actors, 146 justifying a requirement that broadcast licensees
donate air time to political candidates. 147 Additionally, he might permit
campaign finance regulations "in the most unusual and limited of
circumstances."' 148 Neither of their allowances, however, actually
justifies any meaningful limits on market distribution of expressive
opportunities. Sullivan's constitutional suspicion of any effort to
increase the "diversity or competitiveness" of public debate, 49 and of
regulations designed to serve the public interest 5 ° effectively dooms
cross-ownership restrictions or "must carry" rules if the government
intends them to affect the quality or diversity of information available to
the public-which is exactly why the government imposes any
regulation on an informational market. Post apparently would restrict the
form of permissible regulation to subsidies and the scope of permissible
regulation to limited, unspecified circumstances in which broadcasters
can be characterized as lacking autonomy interests.' 5 ' Paradoxically, he
suggests justifying speech regulations by narrowing his category of
"public discourse," which defines the very zone of democratic debate in
52
which access rights find their justification.

143. Sullivan, Unfree Markets, supra note 107, at 964; see also Sullivan, Intermediaries,supra
note 60, at 1659 (explaining "the Supreme Court's deference to regulations that it can characterize
as market-structuring rather than ideological"); Sullivan, Resurrecting, supra note 129, at 979-80
(explaining how the purpose/effect distinction in regulating speech allows for economic attributes of
a speech market to be regulated).
144. See Sullivan, Discrimination, supra note 101, at 445 (distinguishing "markets in ideas"
from "markets in products that convey ideas" as bases for endorsing media cross-ownership
restrictions).
145. See id. at 450-51 (characterizing "must-carry" rules as promoting "diversity of
competitors, not enforced diversity of substantive views"); see also Sullivan, Intermediaries,supra
note 60, at 1661-62.
146. Post, Equality andAutonomy, supra note 102, at 1539.
147. See Robert Post, Commentary, Regulating Election Speech Under the First Amendment,
77 TEX. L. REv. 1837, 1837 (1999).
148. Post, Meiklejohn's Mistake, supranote 103, at 1133.
149. Sullivan, Intermediaries,supra note 60, at 1661.
150. See id. at 1662.
151. See Post, Subsidized Speech, supra note 114, at 158-63 (suggesting that imposing
conditions on broadcasters may be permissible where broadcasters function as public trustees).
152. See Post, Equality and Autonomy, supra note 102, at 1539 (stating that boundaries of
"public discourse" are "negotiable" and that "much regulation outside that arena
is ...constitutionally unproblematic") (citation omitted). This notion is especially curious given
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C. The Failingsof the LibertarianCritique
Once the progressive libertarians' nuanced rhetoric and subtle
arguments against access rights stand revealed as accessories to the
familiar conservative libertarian equation of expressive freedom with
market distribution, a single set of objections can answer the libertarian
critique. The libertarians' constitutional case for reserving distribution of
economic opportunities to the economic marketplace, and thus rejecting
access rights, fails on three levels: empirical, theoretical, and normative.
I will briefly set forth the principal failings on each level that are most
salient and decisive in the context of Barron's case for access rights.
On an empirical level, critical analysis forecloses the foundational
libertarian premise that any departure from market distributions of
expressive opportunities contradicts speakers' and audiences'
autonomously formed interests. In general, information is an extremely
difficult good to commodify because information, by definition, is
unknown until it is acquired. 153 If the market excludes from the airwaves
a speaker whose position the audience has not heard, and whose
existence may not even be known to the audience, then the market
cannot be enforcing the audience's autonomous choice to exclude her. In
the particular context of the mass media, C. Edwin Baker has built a
watertight case against uncritical reliance on market principles, even
assuming those principles properly apply to other goods. Baker
emphasizes numerous ways in which special characteristics of media
products-including substantial public good characteristics, significant
positive and negative externalities, and accountability to the dual
demands of audiences and advertisers-can distort the market
relationship between what participants in public discourse want and
what content media companies deliver.154 The market's commodification
of information, and the background legal rules against which the market
55
necessarily operates, tend to influence the preferences people express.
Post's concession that "[t]here is obviously no theoretically neutral way" to define the boundaries of
public discourse. Post, OutrageousOpinion, supra note 106, at 671.
153. This problem correlates with Arrow's information paradox, which holds that sellers of

information, in order to persuade potential buyers of the information's value, may have to reveal the
information and thus diminish or destroy its value. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and
the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY:

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 614-16 (1962). Information in this sense also constitutes a
sort of "experience good," because audiences have difficulty assessing information's value prior to
receiving it. See generally Philip Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior, 78 J. POL. ECON.
311 (1970) (explaining concept of experience goods).
154. See BAKER, supra note 68, at 7-121.

155. Seeid. at64-71.
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The market's reliance on consumers' ability and willingness to pay
necessarily overemphasizes the interests of wealthier consumers, an
emphasis that requires normative justification.1 56 The market can
measure only preferences expressed through purchase decisions, a
metric that ignores other communicative interests and artificially favors
5 7 Baker's
choices that the market itself substantively influences.
analysis explodes the libertarian fiction that market distributions embody
human freedom and that any58redistribution of expressive opportunities
therefore undermines liberty.1
On a theoretical level, the libertarian critics' case for informational
markets depends on an overly simplistic principle of autonomy,
accompanied by an underdeveloped distinction between public and
private authorities. 59 Libertarian critics inevitably invoke the sorry
history of government censorship as if it inherently refuted the case for
access rights, 60 without considering the burdens that concentrations of
market power impose on people's freedom to speak and to receive
information. Libertarians exacerbate their theoretical fallacy by cloaking
their defenses of powerful institutions' expressive primacy in the
6'
inapposite rhetoric of "individual" or "personal" autonomy,'

156. See id. at 71-80.
at 80-93.
157. See id.
158. This discontinuity between market distributions and autonomous choice discredits efforts
by some libertarians to discern a paternalistic scheme in access rights advocates' descriptive
contention that collective processes necessarily influence individuals' choices. See Gey, supra note
78, at 212 (ascribing to access rights advocates the belief that "government should seek to cure the
dissenters of their misguided attitudes"); Yoo, Rise and Demise, supra note 60, at 323 (claiming that
access rights advocates "regard[] an individual's personality as a social construct subject to
improvement by the state"). In fact, as Baker suggests, libertarians themselves engage in
paternalism when they reduce people's interests to only what the market can measure, see BAKER,
supra note 68, at 83-84, and when they seek to place the media beyond popular control. See id. at
121.
159. For a discussion of conceptual problems with the public-private distinction as manifest in
constitutional doctrine, see Magarian, Public-PrivateDistinction,supra note 3, at 135-46.
160. See Fried, supra note 60, at 226; Gey, supra note 78,,at 278-79; Yoo, Rise and Demise,
supranote 60, at 338.
161. See, e.g., REDISH, supra note 60, at 182 (emphasizing democratic value of "personal
intellectual autonomy"); Fried, supra note 60, at 234 ("The paradigmatic free speech case is one in
which government prevents a person from speaking or punishes him for having spoken .... ); Gey,
supra note 78, at 274-75 (asserting that "government regulation of speech continues to deal with a
highly individualistic phenomenon"); McGinnis, supra note 60, at 57 (claiming to advocate a theory
"in which the First Amendment... protects the individual's right to transmit his information");
Post, Meiklejohn's Mistake, supra note 103, at 1130-31 (focusing autonomy-based First
Amendment theory on individual citizens); Yoo, Rise and Demise, supra note 60, at 331 (describing
state action doctrine in terms of "the relationship between the individual and the state"). Redish
defends the expressive rights of powerful institutions based on the premise that institutions have
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submerging- the complex power relationships that enmesh flesh-andblood individuals, government institutions, and nongovernmental
institutions. Elsewhere I have contended that courts should understand
the First Amendment, at least in times of war and national emergency, as
fully safeguarding the expressive autonomy of natural persons, in order
to preserve the essential space within which we generate and evaluate
ideas, but as shielding institutions' autonomy only to the extent doing so
instrumentally serves the paramount First Amendment value of
collective self-determination.1 62 For libertarians, expressive freedom
bars any alteration in the regulatory status quo that necessarily shapes
market relationships, regardless of where that status quo leaves the
informational quality and inclusive character of public discourse. Their
theory promises freedom but delivers only a flimsy abstraction,
unmoored to any principle save the expressive entitlement of the
market's winners.
Beyond these empirical and theoretical concerns, libertarians'
reliance on economic markets to distribute expressive opportunities
presents massive normative problems. The libertarian analysis
substitutes blind fealty to the market for any consideration of the value
judgments that necessarily underlie any policy choice, including laissezfaire distribution of expressive opportunities. 163 The central normative
problem with the libertarian critique arises from the mass media's
unique power to inform and influence democratic deliberation, providing
opportunities for a wide range of people to participate in public debate
and giving most members of the political community their most
important source of access to diverse perspectives and information on
important controversies. If the media distributes access inequitably or
presents only a limited range of viewpoints on issues of public concern,
then public discourse suffers serious damage that may in turn undermine
democratic self-government. 64 Constitutional speech protection serves,
feelings too. See REDISH, supra note 60, at 180 (crediting "large media outlet(s)" with capacity for
"cognitive dissonance, public humiliation, and personal demoralization").
162.

See Magarian, Public-PrivateDistinction,supra note 3, at 149-50.

163. Baker has captured the essence of the problem: "The most important and most difficult
tasks for law and legal scholarship are to understand, interpret, and reason about values and
normative visions-and for this, economics is largely irrelevant." C. Edwin Baker, Commentary,
Media Structure, Ownership Policy, and the FirstAmendment, 78 S.CAL.L. REV. 733, 747 & n.49

(2005) [hereinafter Baker, Media Structure].
164. Post argues, to the contrary, that distributive justice concerns fundamentally contradict
democratic values, because the substantive democratic commitment to self-government necessarily
transcends any baseline of distributive justice. See Post, Democracy, supra note 11, at 28-30.
Democracy, on his account, requires not substantive equality but rather "equality of agency" to
participate in public discourse. Id. at 29. Expressive freedom confers that equality of agency by
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at least in substantial part, to ensure open and effective democratic
debate. Libertarians' insistence that courts should subordinate that
constitutional value to the vagaries of profit motives and demand
curves-indeed, that courts must do so-turns our democratic system on
its head.
The progressive libertarian attack on the compatibility of access
rights' two primary goals, broadening participation and improving
debate, 165 appears to furnish a logical riposte to access rights advocates'
normative complaint that market distributions disserve democracy. If we
have no good reason to believe that equalizing access to media would'
improve public debate, the progressive libertarians ask, then how can we
justify departing from the market status quo? Like other libertarian
arguments against access rights, however, this gambit rests on nothing
more than a normative commitment to the constitutional sanctity of
market distributions. If the economic market produces the only
distribution of expressive opportunities consistent with a proper
understanding of the First Amendment, then any absence of a speaker or
idea from public debate must amount to an efficient exclusion of
irrelevant information, and altering the market's distributive scheme
could not possibly improve the quality of debate.166 The case for access
rights depends on a different normative account of the relationship
between inclusion and information. Ingrained in the case for access
rights is confidence in the ability of an engaged polity to generate
productive debate, with broader participation producing a wider and
more informative range of ideas for the community to evaluate. 167 That
optimistic egalitarian premise, in my view, resonates far more clearly

"permit[ting] persons to speak in the ways, manner, and circumstances of their choosing." Id. Thus,
government regulations that impede speakers' choices violate democratic precepts. See id. at 29-30.
Oddly, despite his acknowledgement that government sometimes must ameliorate material
inequalities in order to sustain democratic legitimacy, see id. at 33, Post never explains how his
formal vision of expressive freedom can foster democratically legitimate discourse when some
people can indulge their choices to participate in expensive forms of persuasion while others cannot.
165. See supra notes 101-06 and accompanying text.
166. Conservative libertarians, of course, openly condemn access rights advocates' appeals to
distributive justice concerns. See supra notes 85-100 and accompanying text. For a thorough and
eloquent defense of distributive justice in the context of media access, see BAKER, supra note 68, at
71-80.

167. See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text (discussing Barron's linkage between
access rights' informational benefits for the general public and inclusive benefits for marginalized
speakers).
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than libertarians' deliberative Darwinism with our ideals and aspirations
for participatory democracy.' 68
The danger of which libertarian critics most loudly warn is not that
access rights will fail to make democratic debate more informative and
inclusive, but that any attempt to do so will censor speech and steer
debate toward favored substantive results. 169 This authoritarian smear
makes for bombastic rhetorical theater, but it has nothing to do with
Barron's evenhanded, substantively neutral formulation of access
rights. 170 To some extent the discontinuity between Barron's case for
access rights and libertarians' attacks may result from the louder echo in
libertarian ears of Professors Fiss and Sunstein's more recent appeals for
access rights. Writing during the relative political calm of the 1980s and
early 1990s, Fiss and Sunstein displayed less concern than Barron about
immediate threats to political dissent and arguably placed greater
emphasis on advancing their substantive social visions. 17 1 Nonetheless,
libertarian critics' blatant disregard of the procedural case for access
rights reflects both a careless inattention to Barron and a sad incapacity
to imagine any constitutional world between the paradise of laissez-faire
capitalism and the inferno of the absolutist state. To the extent
libertarians bother to engage the procedural case for access rights, they
insist that access rights, even if substantively neutral, would court
tyranny by requiring, in Fried's phrase, "equality of results" among

168. Indeed, the assumption that greater inclusiveness serves the instrumental ends of
democracy has become integral to our constitutional order. See Morton J. Horwitz, Foreword, The
Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality Without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 30,
63-64 (1993) (discussing Warren Court's reconciliation of protecting minority rights with advancing
democratic values).
169. See supra notes 94-100, 134-41 and accompanying text.
170. See discussion supra Part II.A. Redish tacitly acknowledges Barron's procedural
approach, grudgingly conceding that "not all commentators who have urged the creation of a right
of access appear to advocate a seemingly process-based expressive redistribution as little more than
a procedural means to achieve the substantive end of economic justice." REDISH, supra note 60, at
169. That quotation, amazingly, comes from a longer sentence. For a writer as articulate as Redish
to torture the language so gruesomely betrays something-in this case, that he has no persuasive
response to Barron's forthrightly procedural theory of access rights.
171. See, e.g., Fiss, State Activism, supra note 45, at 2100 (advocating a role for the state as a
"high-minded parliamentarian"); SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 46, at 18-23 (advancing the
Madisonian vision of democracy). If one reads Fiss and Sunstein fairly, however, their
commitments to substantive freedom of expression become obvious. See, e.g., Fiss, Social
Structure, supra note 45, at 1421 (advocating process norms for speech protection and disavowing
direction of substantive outcomes); see also SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 46, at 35
(emphasizing dangers of speech regulation and stating that government should never regulate
viewpoint or quality of content).
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different speakers who seek to influence public debate. 172 That assertion,
however, presumes an absolutist posture that no advocate of access
rights has ever taken. Any effort to make access to important social
goods more egalitarian requires ongoing assessment of what "equality"
requires and to what extent equalization should supersede competing
social values.
The political theory behind the libertarian critique poses a final
normative problem. Libertarians treat interest group pluralism, and the
vision of autonomy it spawns, not merely as the best explanation of how
politics should work, but rather as the only explanation consistent with a
meaningful account of expressive freedom. 73 In contrast, arguments for
access rights usually, although not necessarily, resonate with civic
republican principles.1 74 Access rights advocates posit a need for the
political community to debate openly and actively about the issues of
public importance, including the proper policy balance between the
values of equality and autonomy. The idea of access rights makes no
internal sense if political values are not constantly subject to debate and
the political order open to revision. Thus, to the extent access rights rest
on civic republican premises, those premises themselves-and, indeed,
all facets of access rights-must remain constantly open to debate.
Libertarians, on the other hand, seek to entrench an uncontestable
pluralist account of democracy by reifying market distributions of
expressive opportunities. 175 From the perspective of market
triumphalism, the idea that democratic ideals might cause us to favor
redistribution of expressive opportunities is the only political idea we
may not consider.

172. Fried, supra note 60, at 230; see also Post, Equality and Autonomy, supra note 102, at
1534 (ascribing to access rights advocates the position "that the state be required affirmatively to
ensure that all persons exercise equal influence on public discourse"); id. at 1537 (asserting that
access rights proposals require "[a]llotting speech in precisely equal portions").
173. See supra notes 82-84, 117-20 and accompanying text (discussing libertarian critics'
commitment to interest group pluralism).
174. Compare Magarian, PoliticalParties,supra note 54, at 1980-82 (discussing the affinity

between republican political theory and First Amendment theory that accommodates access rights),
with Stephen A. Gardbaum, Colloquy, Broadcasting, Democracy, and the Market, 82 GEO. L.J.

373, 382-88 (1993) (critiquing civic republican emphasis on consensus and making a case for access
rights based on expansive conception of autonomy).
175. Ironically, libertarians repeatedly accuse access rights advocates of seeking to entrench a
civic republican political theory. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
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THE REGULATORY REFORM CRITIQUE OF ACCESS RIGHTS

The other critique of access rights, which I call the regulatory
reform critique, embraces "access" but not "rights." The first section of
this part describes the regulatory reform position. Like Barron and his
successors, regulatory reformers believe the market inequitably
distributes important forms of expressive access, particularly access to
the media. Also like access rights advocates, regulatory reformers
believe government can and should work to solve the problem of
inequitable distribution. The regulatory reformers, however,
substantially accept as a descriptive matter the libertarian premise that
the First Amendment protects the autonomy of private actors, and they
distrust courts as agents of social reform. Accordingly, they would
narrow the scope of the First Amendment, in order to allow the elected
branches of government to distribute expressive opportunities more
equitably. The second section of this part criticizes the regulatory
reformers'
institutional
prescription.
The
elected
branches,
notwithstanding the regulatory reformers' serene confidence in their
value for broadening media access, labor under a set of electoral
pathologies that generally fray elected officials' accountability to the
people and particularly exclude the expressive interests of poor and
socially marginalized speakers from elected officials' political
calculations. In contrast, the First Amendment presents the most
theoretically coherent and normatively appealing basis for broadening
expressive access, and courts' capacity to apply the First Amendment to
access disputes makes them the optimal arbiters of an access rights
regime.
A.

The Regulatory Reform Critique'sTheoretical Grounding and
InstitutionalLogic

C. Edwin Baker has articulated the most thorough regulatory
reform approach to the media access problem. Baker's core First
Amendment theory resembles that of the libertarians, because he
steadfastly asserts personal autonomy as the core value protected by the
Free Speech Clause.176 Baker, however, takes a distinctive and nuanced
approach to the autonomy theory, critically evaluating different entities'
autonomy claims 177 and subordinating autonomy to democratic values in
176. Baker articulates and defends his "liberty model" of expressive freedom in C. Edwin
Baker, Scope of the FirstAmendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 990-92 (1978).

177. Baker has argued that commercial entities lack the autonomy interest necessary to assert a
First Amendment claim because the market, and not the commercial speaker's conscience, dictates
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the particular contexts of electoral speech 1 78 and the media. 79 He
contends that the instrumental interests of a healthy democracy, and not
the autonomy interests of speakers, should dictate First Amendment
protection in those areas. 80 Baker criticizes the mass media as "too
timid in exposing corruption and abuse both of public and especially of
private power, insufficiently diverse in its presentations, relatively
unresponsive to significant elements of society and more encouraging of
political passivity than public involvement."' 8' He strongly objects to
First Amendment theories that treat media institutions as primary
subjects of rights or limit the scope of democratic concern to efficient
pricing of media products. 82 However, he rejects the idea of
constitutionally mandated media access rights, because he believes
courts lack both the authority to make normative judgments about what
democratic values the press should serve at any given time, 83 and the
competence to make empirical judgments about the proper shape of
84 Accordingly, he posits a First Amendment
access measures.
"nonmandate"'' 85 under which courts should uphold regulations that
enhance media access, with particular solicitude for structural
regulations of media ownership. 86 Baker's conception of elections as
discursively limited constructs for converting public opinion into
political power similarly leads him to advocate constitutional allowance
the content of commercial expression. See generally C. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A
Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1976).
178. See C. Edwin Baker, Campaign Expenditures and Free Speech, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 1, 3 (1998) [hereinafter Baker, Campaign Expenditures].

179. Baker's major recent statements on expressive freedom and the press include BAKER,
supra note 68, at 125-28; Baker, Media Concentration, supra note 65; Baker, Media Structure,
supra note 163.
180. See C. Edwin Baker, Private Power, the Press, and the Constitution, 10 CONST.
COMMENT. 421, 436 (1993) [hereinafter Baker, Private Power] (distinguishing relative importance
of autonomy values and instrumental democratic considerations in speech and press contexts); see
also Baker, Campaign Expenditures, supra note 178, at 28-29 (characterizing elections as
"institutionally bound" and measures that constrain electoral speech thus appropriate "to assure the
fairness and openness of elections").
181. Baker, Private Power, supra note 180, at 426.
182. See Baker, Media Concentration, supra note 65, at 855-60.
183. See BAKER, supra note 68, at 212-13 (advocating regime of constitutional space for media
regulation pursuant to Baker's preferred democratic model of "complex democracy"); Baker,
Private Power, supra note 180, at 439 (questioning the appropriateness of judicial determinations
about how the press should serve democratic values).
184. See BAKER, supra note 68, at 199 (questioning judicial competence to make empirical
determinations about effectuating access); Baker, Private Power, supra note 180, at 439 (stating the
same proposition).
185. BAKER, supra note 68, at 199.
186. See Baker, Media Concentration, supra note 65, at 905-06 (contending that healthy
democracy requires substantial dispersion of opportunities to influence public opinion).
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for regulations of electoral speech
that would make electoral debate
87
inclusive.
and
informed
more
Jack Balkin has followed a circuitous intellectual path to arrive at
his regulatory reform orientation. In an early treatment of the access
issue, in 1990, Balkin tracked Barron's case for access rights perhaps
more closely than any scholar before or since. He argued then that the
idea of democratic pluralism had come unmoored from its legal realist
roots, resulting in a First Amendment doctrine of formal equality that
ignored crucial inequalities in access to means of expression.' 8 8 As a
remedy for this ideological drift, he advocated a substantive
understanding of the First Amendment as requiring access rights, to be
secured in the first instance by judicial enforcement. 189 In a more recent
article, however, Balkin argues that the growth of the Internet must alter
our conception of expressive freedom in fundamental ways. 190 While he
disavows the technological optimist dogma that the Internet will solve
all distributional problems,' 91 he nonetheless argues that the Internet's
democratizing effects on public discourse should shift our attention from
equality to autonomy and from problems of access to problems of
censorship. 192 He also urges a shift in our institutional conception of
expressive freedom, from a focus on judicial protection 'to a greater
emphasis on the elected branches of government and technological
developments in the private sector as guarantors of expressive
freedom.193 Although Balkin does not explicitly repudiate his earlier call
for access rights, his new analysis emphasizes only the negative sense of

187. See Baker, Campaign Expenditures,supra note 178, at 33-37.
188. See J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First
Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 387-94 [hereinafter Balkin, Realism] (explaining the

development of libertarian aspects of First Amendment doctrine in terms of democratic pluralism).
189.
190.
191.

See id. at412-13.
See Balkin, DigitalSpeech, supra note 60.
See id. at 31-32 (explaining why we should not expect the Internet to solve problems of

media diversity); cf supra notes 62-74 and accompanying text (contesting technological optimist
arguments against access rights).
192. See Balkin, Digital Speech, supra note 60, at 43-45 (arguing for renewed emphasis on
liberty in free speech theory). Balkin ascribes to technological developments perhaps a larger
portion of his theoretical evolution than they can plausibly explain. He does not make clear, for
example, why changes in communications technology should make popular culture more important
in First Amendment theory than it was before. See id. at 34-35 (advocating shift away from
government and toward culture as object of free speech concern). Some of Balkin's new ideas seem
more plausibly rooted in his intellectual engagement with populism and critique of progressivism.
See generally Balkin, Populism,supra note 116.

193. See Balkin, Digital Speech, supra note 60, at 51-54 (arguing for a shift in focus from
judicial protection of free speech rights to legislative, administrative, and technological protection
of free speech values).

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol35/iss3/13

36

Magarian: Market Triumphalism, Electoral Pathologies, and the Abiding Wisdo
2007]

MARKET TRIUMPHALISM

the First Amendment and strongly downplays the efficacy of judicially
enforced expressive freedom.
Mark Tushnet does not address access rights proposals directly but
offers an alternative, contrary First Amendment vision responsive to the
same concerns that underlie Barron's analysis. Tushnet sees in
contemporary free speech doctrine a lamentable but intractable fixation
on protecting the rights of the powerful. 194 Accordingly, in constitutional
law generally and the free speech context in particular, he holds out little
hope for judicially imposed progressive change. In his farthest-reaching
argument about institutional approaches to constitutional law, Tushnet
advocates a regime in which robust notions of constitutional rights
persist but the people, acting through political processes, supplant judges
as the principal arbiters of constitutional values.' 95 In a milder variation
on that argument, he advocates a process of "weak-form judicial
review," under which constitutional doctrine would develop over time
through judicial-legislative interaction on novel or unsettled
constitutional issues.196 He illustrates this process with what he calls the
"managerial model" of free speech, under which courts defer to
regulations that the legislature believes "increase the availability of
expression-net or on balance."' 97 Without providing a full assessment
of the managerial model, Tushnet points out its manifestation in cases
upholding cable "must carry" rules, campaign finance regulations, and
extensions of copyright protections. 198 Tushnet acknowledges that the
Court usually practices a stronger brand of judicial review that
constrains legislative initiatives to expand expressive opportunities,' 99
but he suggests that weak-form judicial review, as exemplified by the
managerial model, would provide a normatively desirable basis for
regulatory efforts to enhance expressive freedom.
The regulatory reformers' simultaneous support for egalitarian
government initiatives and skepticism about constitutionally driven
194.

See MARK TUSHNET, A COURT DIVIDED: THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE FUTURE OF

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 314 (2005) (noting "[t]he emergence of conservative free speech absolutism
on the Rehnquist Court"); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS
161 (1999) [hereinafter TUSHNET, AWAY FROM THE COURTS] (criticizing free speech doctrine for
underprotecting speech critical of government while ignoring distributional inequalities of wealth).
195. See TUSHNET, AWAY FROM THE COURTS, supra note 194, at 9-14 (arguing against judicial
supremacy in favor of a populist debate on matters involving the Constitution's fundamental
guarantees).
196. See Mark Tushnet, Essay, Weak-Form Judicial Review and "'Core"Civil Liberties, 41
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 2, 9-11 (2006) [hereinafter Tushnet, Weak-Form Review].
197. Id. at 12.
198. See id. at 13-16.
199. See id. at 3-4 (discussing the Rehnquist Court's defense of strong-form judicial review).
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change appears to reflect the complicated inspiration of the New Deal
and legal realism. The New Deal has strongly influenced those

normative premises of access rights that the regulatory reformers most
obviously embrace: the desire for more informative and inclusive public
debate and the concern with achieving just distributions of expressive
°
opportunities 00
The regulatory reformers also echo access rights

advocates' quintessentially realist insight that the public-private
distinction is a normative construct rather than an inevitable and organic
precondition for freedom.2 °' On the other hand, the regulatory reform
position exemplifies the New Deal appetite for politically driven reform

and disdain for judicial interference with regulatory initiatives.20 2
Although the regulatory reformers' prescription for legislative and
administrative action to expand expressive access entails a high degree
of confidence in the elected branches, they provide few affirmative

grounds for that confidence. Tushnet, the regulatory reformer who most
thoroughly defends a greater role for elected officials in constitutional
interpretation, can only argue that courts' present dominance of
constitutional law precludes any confident judgment that elected
officials could not handle constitutional questions,20 3 while elected

officials' general incentives would not necessarily stop them from
protecting constitutional rights.20 4 Conversely, regulatory reformers
manifest severe doubts about courts' ability to achieve positive change
by applying the First Amendment to inequalities of access. Those doubts
200. For evidence of the New Deal's importance in shaping arguments for access rights, see
SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 46, at 28-38 (advocating "a New Deal for Speech"); Balkin,

Realism, supra note 188, at 388-91 (tying instrumental, egalitarian theory of rights to judicial
revolution of 1937); Fiss, Why the State?, supra note 45, at 781, 783 (invoking New Deal in support
of proposals for government regulation to improve public debate).
201. See Baker, Private Power, supra note 180, at 422 ("[T]he real question [about state
action] is always a matter of a substantive interpretation of constitutional norms."); Balkin, Realism,
supra note 188, at 412 (advocating abandonment of rigid public-private distinction in free speech
context); Mark Tushnet, The Supreme Court and Its FirstAmendment Constituency, 44 HASTINGS
L.J. 881, 885, 898 (1993) (critically analyzing role of public-private distinction in setting cognizable
range of constitutional claims).
202. Tushnet expressly attributes his doubts about judicial protection of speech to the New
Deal paradigm. See Mark Tushnet, The Culture(s) of Free Expression, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1106,
1114 & n.27 (1991) [hereinafter Tushnet, Culture(s)] (reviewing STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST
AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE (1990)). Of course, as Tushnet has acknowledged, the
New Deal's redistributive revolution also benefited from judicial action, particularly as to
expressive opportunities. See Louis MICHAEL SEIDMAN & MARK V. TUSHNET, REMNANTS OF
BELIEF: CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 120 (1996) (discussing Supreme Court's early

public forum cases).
203. See TUSHNET, AWAY FROM THE COURTS, supra note 194, at 57-65 (discussing predictive
problems caused by "judicial overhang").
204. See id. at 65-70.
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have two distinct dimensions: one relating to the First Amendment's
substantive underpinnings, the other relating to courts' institutional
attributes.2 °5
The regulatory reformers' objection to judicially mandated access
rights turns, first, on their First Amendment theory. Although regulatory
reformers largely share access rights proponents' normative view that
redistribution of expressive opportunities would benefit society, they
actually view the First Amendment in a manner descriptively consistent
with the libertarians. As discussed above, access rights advocates
construe the First Amendment as an instrument for achieving effective
debate; libertarians, in contrast, object to access rights based on their
belief that the First Amendment does nothing more than prevent the
government from compromising the expressive autonomy of people who
possess the means to speak and be heard. Regulatory reformers, although
advocating access enhancements, tend to agree with libertarians as a
descriptive matter that the First Amendment exclusively or primarily
serves to protect expressive autonomy.20 6 Regulatory reformers'
disagreement with libertarians about the constitutionality of accessenhancing regulations boils down to a dispute about how much territory
the Amendment's protective shield should cover. Libertarians believe in
a strong First Amendment; regulatory reformers believe in a weaker
First Amendment that neither provides any guarantee of access rights
nor impedes the elected branches from redistributing access.
The second dimension of regulatory reformers' skepticism about
courts' role in broadening expressive access is institutional. Regulatory
reform arguments, reflecting widespread mistrust in the legal academy

205. Those libertarian critics of access rights who address institutional considerations dismiss
the idea of judicial implementation with little or no analysis. See REDISH, supra note 60, at 174
(dismissing judiciary's capacity to administer access rights because of its asserted failings in other
First Amendment contexts); McGinnis, supra note 60, at 124-25 (asserting unnamed judicial
"biases" and presuming inability of courts to assess access claims under "neutral principles"); see
also Yoo, Rise and Demise, supra note 60, at 325-26 (arguing that access rights proposals are
unworkable).
206. See Balkin, Realism, supra note 188, at 385 (including autonomy among values served by
First Amendment); Tushnet, Culture(s), supra note 202, at 1107-10 (sympathetically analyzing
eclectic theory of First Amendment that incorporates autonomy concerns). While autonomy stands
at the normative, as well as descriptive, center of Baker's free speech theory, he puts greater
emphasis on democratic process values in the contexts of media and electoral regulations. See supra
notes 176-87 and accompanying text. The primary effect of Baker's bifurcation, however, is to limit
the First Amendment's force in those settings, not to imbue it with a different sort of force. Thus,
for Baker, enforcement of First Amendment rights serves-and should serve-primarily to protect
autonomy.
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207
cast doubt on
about judges as agents of progressive social change,
courts' ability to enhance marginalized speakers' media access under the
First Amendment. The regulatory reformers emphasize courts' persistent
failures to advance progressive free speech values. 20 8 As Tushnet
acknowledges, however, one branch's shortcomings do not suffice to
justify dislodging its authority.20 9 Just as the regulatory reformers offer
few reasons to favor the elected branches as vehicles for access reform,
they provide little to substantiate their low opinion of courts. Tushnet's
extensive critique of judicial review concludes that courts generally do
no more than reinforce the prevailing political order. 210 Baker suggests,
without going into detail, that "[c]onstitutional adjudication is poorly
designed for crafting appropriate structural rules and media
subsidies." 2 ' Balkin takes a similar view, with particular reference to
the complexities of advanced information technologies, in a similarly
terse but sweeping manner.21 2 The regulatory reformers' objection to
judicial review may depend less on particular failings of courts than on
the regulatory reformers' normative visions of institutional design.
Balkin's and Tushnet's preference for a politically rather than judicially
driven constitutional order corresponds with their aspirations toward
greater political populism. 21 3 Baker expresses the same preference, albeit
limited to the context of media regulation.21 4

207. See Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 181-85 (2002).
208.

See TUSHNET, AWAY FROM THE COURTS, supra note

194, at 129-33 (discussing

conservative tilt of recent free speech decisions); Baker, Media Concentration, supra note 65, at
848-55 (discussing conservative tilt in recent First Amendment decisions on media ownership);
Balkin, DigitalSpeech, supra note 60, at 19-21 (discussing present judicial equation of speech with
property in telecommunications policy disputes).
209. "The real question is whether in general legislatures or courts make more, and more
important, constitutional mistakes." TUSHNET, AWAY FROM THE COURTS, supra note 194, at 57.
210. See id. at 153 (arguing that judicial deviations from prevailing political trends amount to
random alterations with minimal normative consequences in the aggregate).
211. BAKER, supra note 68, at 199.
212. See Balkin, DigitalSpeech, supra note 60, at 53-54.
213. See TUSHNET, AWAY FROM THE COURTS, supra note 194, at 177-94 (defending theory of
"populist constitutional law"); Balkin, Populism, supra note 116, at 1985-90 (extolling virtues of
populist satisfaction with sporadic political engagement as opposed to "elitist" preoccupation with
ordinary politics).
214. See BAKER, supra note 68, at 213 ("[T]he Press Clause should be read to allow the
government to promote a press that, in its best judgment, democracy needs but that the market fails
to provide.").
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B.

Courts, the Elected Branches, and Access Rights: The Failings of
the Regulatory Reform Critique

The regulatory reform critique depends on two complementary
premises, both of which I believe contain useful insights but ultimately
lead to the wrong conclusion. First, regulatory reformers assert that
legislators and regulators have the capacity and will to implement access
reforms. That assertion ignores pathologies of our present electoral
system that severely undermine the elected branches' incentives to
pursue more informative and inclusive public debate. Those pathologies
take on added importance because they contribute to the deficiencies in
public discourse that led Barron to advocate access rights. Second,
regulatory reformers treat constitutional rights as a theoretical dead end,
and courts as an institutional albatross, in the quest for more egalitarian
access to public debate. Those views underestimate both the First
Amendment's theoretical value for framing access interests and courts'
utility for implementing a meaningful regime of access rights.
1.

The Implications of Electoral Pathologies for Legislative and
Regulatory Access Reforms
Regulatory reformers, like access rights advocates, aspire to a more
egalitarian distribution of opportunities to participate, and a broader
range of ideas present, in public debate. Unlike access rights advocates,
however, regulatory reformers place their faith in elected officials 215 to
accomplish that distribution. Unfortunately, several prominent features
of our electoral system discourage legislative and regulatory access
initiatives. Some of those problems are permanent and inherent to the
system but not fatal to the access rights agenda. Others are distinctive to
our present political order and, I believe, more toxic to hopes for
legislative and regulatory access reforms. First, several pivotal
restrictions on electoral competition operate to make elected officials
unaccountable to their constituents. To the extent access reforms would
serve a general interest in broadening public debate, these pathologies of
unaccountability remove elected officials' incentives to advance that
interest. Second, economically and socially marginalized members of the
political community continue to face several formidable barriers to

215. This discussion uses the term "elected officials" as shorthand for the full range of
policymakers within the legislative and executive branches of the federal government. Although
state elected officials have some capacity to impose access reforms and face some of the electoral
pathologies I discuss in this section, I follow the regulatory reformers in focusing my attention on
federal elected officials.
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electoral participation. To the extent access reforms would serve to open
opportunities for such people to participate in public debate, these
pathologies of exclusion leave elected officials especially unmotivated to
advance that interest. Beyond their destructive effects on elected
officials' motivation to implement access reforms, all of these electoral
pathologies underscore Barron's case for access rights in an even more
direct way: each substantially diminishes the quality and openness of
electoral debate.
a.

Inherent Disincentives to Access Reforms

Public choice theory suggests one set of obstacles to legislative and
regulatory access reforms: Elected officials typically act to advance their
own self-interest, particularly the interest in holding on to power, 1 6 and
powerful and well-organized interest groups can capture them. 21 7 These
factors place two permanent, inherent obstacles in the path of access
reforms. First, they create a strong disincentive for elected officials to
impose reforms that would alter the status quo by bringing new voices
and ideas into public debate. Second, and more ominous, they raise the
danger that elected officials, if granted the power to distribute expressive
opportunities, will abuse that power to advance their own interests or
those of capturing interest groups.
These obstacles warrant some concern, but we should not
overemphasize them. As to the disincentive concern, elected officials in
the past have implemented access reforms, including limits on political
campaign contributions, 1 8 mandates for access to private expressive
property, 2 9 and allocations of mass media space and time. 220 Those
reforms indicate that ordinary political self-interest can correspond with
egalitarian aspirations toward broadened expressive access. As to the
abuse-of-power concern, any suggestion that expressive distributions,
including market distributions, could ever avoid government influence

216.

See

DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS:

THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 4-5

(1974)

(characterizing congressmen as "single-minded seekers of reelection").
217. See, e.g., Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L.
REV. 1,38-39 (1982).
218. See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000) (upholding state
contribution limits).
219. See, e.g., PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (upholding property
access requirement imposed by state constitution).
220. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I1), 520 U.S. 180 (1997) (upholding
must-carry rules for cable systems).
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contradicts logic and history. 221 Moreover, the Supreme Court has
upheld reforms of all the types just noted, finding no dark pattern of
censorship or manipulation. Tushnet, the regulatory reformer who
focuses most intently on institutional considerations, suggests that this
compatibility of ordinary politics with progressive constitutionalism
provides a sufficient basis for preferring elected officials to judges as
guardians of constitutional rights. 22 The present political culture of the
United States, however, presents greater obstacles to access reform than
just those inherent to electoral politics. Our present electoral system
suffers from an amalgam of pathologies that overwhelms regulatory
reformers' vision of legislative and regulatory access reforms.
b.

Pathologies of Unaccountability

As discussed above, one benefit of a more egalitarian regime of
media access accrues to the public generally.2 23 More egalitarian access
to expressive opportunities means that the media offers the public a
broader range of ideas, which should in turn improve the quality of
public debate and the public's level of confidence in the government
decisions that public debate informs. Enhancing public debate generally
cuts against elected officials' self-interest by encouraging challenges to
the status quo. Thus, for elected officials to fulfill the role regulatory
reformers assign them, they must have good reason to believe that
betraying the public's interest in enriching public debate will cost them
more than forestalling reform to preserve the status quo will gain them.
They must, in other words, be accountable to the electorate. Electoral
accountability requires a meaningfully competitive electoral process in
which voters have realistic opportunities to unseat incumbent officials.
Unfortunately, our electoral system in recent years has moved away
from that competitive ideal. Three especially pernicious and prominent
failures of electoral accountability that discourage media access reforms
are partisan gerrymandering of legislative districts, the calcification of
the two-party duopoly, and the dominance of political money.
In recent years, computer technology has transformed the power to
draw electoral districts from a blunt instrument into a surgical scalpel.
That transformation, in turn, has converted redistricting from a boost for

221. See SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 46, at 36-37 (explaining inevitable influence of
government regulatory structures on legal rights).
222. See TUSHNET, AWAY FROM THE COURTS, supra note 194, at 95-128 (positing that
important constitutional values are "incentive-compatible").
223. See supra notes 13-23 and accompanying text.
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challengers into a shield for incumbents. 224 The district-drawing process
has an especially significant effect on elections for the United States
House of Representatives.22 5 Consultants adept in the process can
manipulate the lines to exert decisive influence over apportionment of
legislative power between the two major parties.226 At times, and in
states where some measure of partisan balance prevails, legislatures
bargain over redistricting to build "safe" districts for incumbents of both
parties. Where one party dominates the state legislature, it often uses
redistricting to disable the other party's incumbents and/or to build
"safe" districts for its own. Both of these "partisan gerrymandering"
scenarios exploit the most predictable elements of the electorate to
m Court
or
decrease the likelihood of electoral competition. 227 The Supreme
on three occasions has considered equal protection challenges to partisan
gerrymandering, and all three times it has declined to address the
problem, in what stands as one of the least analytically satisfying lines of
decisions in the Court's recent history. 2 8 Partisan gerrymanders
undermine the cause of media access reform on two levels. First,
diminished competition means that elected representatives need not
account to the electorate for their actions because most elections are
decided long before the voters have their say. In the three national
elections between 2000 and 2004, ninety-seven percent of incumbent
House members who sought reelection prevailed.22 9 The Democrats'
takeover of the House in the 2006 midterm elections is the exception that

224. See Sam Hirsch, The United States House of Unrepresentatives: What Went Wrong in the
Latest Round of CongressionalRedistricting,2 ELECTION L.J. 179, 182 (2003).
225. See generally id. (providing a thorough and incisive account of the effect redistricting had
on U.S. House races following the 2000 census).
226. See SPENCER OVERTON, STEALING DEMOCRACY: THE NEW POLITICS OF VOTER
SUPPRESSION 17-27 (2006).

227. For a discussion of the threat that the systematic creation of safe electoral districts poses
to the health of our democratic system, see generally Richard H. Pildes, The Constitution and
PoliticalCompetition, 30 NOVA L. REV. 253 (2006).
228. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2604, 2606-12 (2006)
(plurality opinion) (finding no legally impermissible use of political classifications in off-year
redistricting that increased Republican share of Texas's thirty-two-member House delegation from
fifteen to twenty-one seats despite small decrease in Republican vote percentage); Vieth v. Jubelirer,
541 U.S. 267 (2004) (plurality opinion) (finding no cause to grant relief for redistricting designed to
increase Republican share of Pennsylvania's House delegation from ten of twenty-one seats to
thirteen of nineteen seats); see also Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 127-43 (1986) (plurality
opinion) (refusing to accept the lower court's standard of review, but failing to state the standard of
review for partisan gerrymandering claims).
229. Center for Responsive Politics, Centerfor Responsive Politics Predicts '06 Election Will
Cost $2.6 Billion, http://www.crp.org/pressreleases/2006/PreElection. 10.25.asp (last visited July 15,
2007).
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proves the rule.23 ° In addition, partisan gerrymanders directly subvert
public debate by manipulating the process to decrease the likelihood that
electoral debate can or will make a difference.2 3'
Recent years have also witnessed a growing divergence of popular
and elite sentiment about the two-party duopoly that dominates our
electoral politics. Voters increasingly claim weak political party loyalties
or identify as independent, rendering the parties more important as
affinity groups within government than as engines for mobilizing public
debate and participation in civic life. 32 At the same time, the major
parties have fought fiercely and successfully to preserve the mechanisms
by which they control elections, resulting in an incongruous system in
which two massive political organizations that command diminishing
voter allegiance nonetheless hold governmental authority in a virtual
hammerlock.23 3 The Supreme Court has allowed the two major parties to
control primary elections as if they were private club meetings, rather
than forums for public debate and decision,23 4 and it has let parties treat
certain expenditures on behalf of their own nominees as "independent"

230. No less a Republican stalwart than Robert Novak declared after the 2006 election that
"[o]nly gerrymandered House districts prevented a landslide that would have given the Democrats a
House majority of historic proportions, approaching 50 seats." Robert D. Novak, Republican
Blindness, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 2006, at A29. Sam Hirsch, in his 2003 indictment of the recent
partisan gerrymanders, presciently identified the development of an overwhelming national trend as
one of a few conditions that might prove powerful enough to overcome district manipulations and
shift control of the House. See Hirsch, supra note 224, at 203 (discussing "Rising-Tide Strategy").
The Iraq War and congressional corruption produced just such a trend in 2006.
231. In a broader view, the issue of partisan gerrymanders implicates the question whether our
longstanding system of single-member geographic districts filled by "winner take all" plurality
voting makes for an effectively representative House of Representatives. See generally LANI
GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY:

FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE

DEMOCRACY 121, 152 (1994) (arguing that districting breeds gerrymandering and that "[w]innertake-all territorial districting imperfectly distributes representation based on group attributes and
disproportionately rewards those who win the representational lottery").
232. See generally Richard L. Hasen, Entrenching the Duopoly: Why the Supreme Court
Should Not Allow the States to Protectthe Democrats and Republicansfrom PoliticalCompetition,
1997 SUP. CT. REV. 331, 350-55 (questioning whether two-party duopoly promotes political
stability, reduces the influence of factions, or enhances the voting cue).
233. See Magarian, PoliticalParties,supra note 54, at 1959-65 (discussing two-party duopoly
and its theoretical underpinnings).
234. See Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581 (2005) (rejecting First Amendment challenge to
state's semiclosed primary system, which barred registrants of one party from voting in another
party's primary); Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000) (sustaining First Amendment
challenge to state's blanket primary system, which allowed primary voter to select a candidate on
any party line for each office). For further analysis of Jones, see Magarian, PoliticalParties,supra
note 54, at 2011-24.
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under the campaign finance laws. 2 3 5 At the same time, the Court has
taken great pains to suppress the meek challenges our system permits to
the two major parties' dominance. The Justices have upheld state
prohibitions on fusion candidacies, which allow minor parties to increase
236
a
and iit has
their profiles by co-nominating major-party candidates,
permitted televised debate sponsors to enforce standardless exclusions of
minor-party candidates.237 Draconian ballot access laws in many
jurisdictions continue to make minor party challenges all but
impossible. 238 The two-party duopoly's continued structural dominance
of our electoral system, like the manipulation of district lines, scuttles
the hopes of regulatory reformers both by diminishing electoral
competition, thus decreasing elected officials' accountability to voters,
and by directly suppressing the multifaceted debate that an electoral
system more open to dynamic competition would foster.
Our present electoral system further erodes political accountability
through the ever-increasing dominance of political money. 239 No one can
mount a credible campaign for Congress without raising, or already
possessing, enormous funds. On the eve of the 2006 midterm elections,
the average House candidate had raised over three quarters of a million
dollars, while the average Senate candidate had raised almost six million
dollars. 240 Incumbents could boast a nearly four-to-one fundraising

235. See Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604 (1996) (striking down
federal limits on expenditures parties make on behalf of candidates without direct coordination
between party and candidate). For further analysis, see Magarian, PoliticalParties,supra note 54, at
2024-31.
236. See Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997) (rejecting First
Amendment challenge to state ban on fusion candidacies). For further analysis, see Magarian,
PoliticalParties,supra note 54, at 2031-37.
237. See Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998) (rejecting First
Amendment challenge to public broadcaster's standardless restriction of televised candidate debates
to major parties' candidates). For further analysis, see Magarian, PoliticalParties,supra note 54, at
2038-43.
238. See, e.g., Richard Winger, More Choice Please! Why U.S. Ballot Access Laws Are
Discriminatoryand How Independent Parties and Candidates Challenge Them, in DEMOCRACY'S
MOMENT: REFORMING THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 45 (Ronald
Hayduk & Kevin Mattson eds., 2002).
239. This Article cannot undertake a thorough examination of campaign finance as an object of
political and legal controversy. For an excellent introduction to the major issues, see Burt Neubome,
One Dollar-One Vote: A Preface to Debating Campaign Finance Reform, 37 WASHBURN L.J. 1
(1997). My position necessarily reflects normative and empirical premises about the role of money
in the political process. For a concise and lucid account of a position based on very different
premises, see Bradley A. Smith, Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences of Campaign
Finance Reform, 105 YALE L.J. 1049 (1996).
240. Center for Responsive Politics, supra note 229.
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advantage over challengers. 241 Total expenditures for the midterms were
on pace to shatter the record-breaking midterm expenditures of 2002 by
eighteen percent.24 2 The Supreme Court has facilitated this state of
affairs by holding campaign expenditure regulations categorically
unconstitutional.24 3 My point here is not to revisit the question of
campaign finance regulations' constitutionality, although the First
Amendment theory that animates the case for access rights would permit
significant limits. 244 Whether or not unfettered campaign spending

deserves constitutional protection, it corrodes electoral accountability.
Like district manipulation and the two-party duopoly, political money
does not serve, but rather supplants electoral competition and public
debate. The allegiance elected officials and political parties owe to the
moneyed interests that finance their victories crowds out their concern
for ordinary voters and gives them a huge incentive to protect the
economic, as well as political, status quo.245 Political money further
decreases accountability by creating a climate of alienation among
people of modest means, discouraging them from participating in the
electoral process, and thus from commanding their representatives'
attention. 246 As for political discourse, our system's laissez faire
approach to political money acts effectively as a debate tax, ensuring a
high correlation between economic power and expressive volume, and
thus drowning out less lavishly financed ideas.247 Advocates of
unrestricted political money intone the mantra that more money means
more speech, conveniently ignoring the corollary that greater expense
means numbing repetition of the same narrow range of ideas by the few
speakers who can afford to make themselves heard.

241. Id.
242. Id.
243. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39-59 (1976) (per curiam). The Court recently
reaffirmed its prohibition on expenditure regulations in Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479 (2006)
(plurality opinion).
244. See Magarian, PoliticalParties,supra note 54, at 2028-30 (discussing consequences of a
public rights First Amendment analysis for Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518
U.S. 604 (1996)).
245. See, e.g., Daniel Hays Lowenstein, On Campaign FinanceReform: The Root ofAll Evil Is
Deeply Rooted, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 301 (1989) (examining influence of political money on actions
of elected officials).
246. See, e.g., J. Skelly Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment
an Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 638 (1982) (justifying campaign

finance regulation as a means to ameliorate voter apathy that corrodes democracy).
247. See, e.g., Julian N. Eule, Promoting Speaker Diversity: Austin and Metro Broadcasting,
1990 SUP. CT. REV. 105, 111-16 (discussing the "drowning out" effect of unregulated political

money).
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Pathologies of Exclusion

The other primary benefit of a more egalitarian regime of media
access accrues to the particular people whose expressive opportunities
such a regime enhances. Those beneficiaries, through meaningful
inclusion in public decisionmaking, can fulfill their rights of equal
citizenship and claim a greater stake in public decisions.248 In order for
elected officials to care about that targeted benefit, however, they must
represent the members of those socially marginal groups. The failures of
general political accountability discussed above disproportionately affect
members of socially marginal groups: drawing of electoral districts
2 49
continues to undermine the democratic aspirations of people of color;
the two major parties marginalize social and ideological outliers; 250 and
political money necessarily diminishes poorer people's influence over
elections. Even beyond those disproportionate failures of accountability,
our electoral system has found distinctive ways to diminish the ability of
poor and socially marginalized members of the political community to
pursue greater political empowerment through media access reforms.
Perhaps our electoral system's most appalling methods of discouraging
elected officials from enhancing poor and marginalized speakers'
expressive opportunities are outright intimidation and suppression of
voters of color, burdensome electoral procedures and "antifraud"
initiatives designed to disqualify poor and socially marginalized voters,
and draconian felon disenfranchisement laws that disproportionately
impact the poor and voters of color.
Our electoral system continues to tolerate a shocking degree of
outright racial and ethnic discrimination. Voters of color frequently
receive misinformation about times and requirements for voting. 251 Mass
mailings or telephone calls on numerous occasions have either given
248. See supra notes 223-24 and accompanying text.
249. See generally GUINIER, supra note 231. Once again, the Supreme Court in recent years
has exacerbated this problem by weakening the legal basis for racially remedial redistricting. See,
e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995) (striking down redistricting plan designed to remedy
underrepresentation of black voters on ground that "bizarre" character of districts under plan
indicated racial motivation behind its design).
250. See Terry Smith, A Black Party? Timmons, Black Backlash and the Endangered TwoParty Paradigm,48 DUKE L.J. 1, 15-22 (1998).
251. See PFAWF & NAACP, THE LONG SHADOW OF JIM CROW: VOTER INTIMIDATION AND
SUPRESSION IN AMERICA TODAY 7 (2004), available at http://www.pfaw.org/pfaw/dfiles/
file_462.pdf [hereinafter LONG SHADOW] (describing a leaflet distributed in African-American
communities in Louisiana in 2002 that encouraged voters to wait to vote until three days after
election day). In African-American precincts in Baltimore, notices were posted anonymously listing
the incorrect date for election day and warning that any parking tickets or overdue rent must be paid
prior to voting. Id.
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false advice or set voters up for special challenges and scrutiny at the
polls.

252

Some mailings have warned that undercover FBI agents or

immigration officials intended to patrol polling places to enforce
criminal penalties for voter fraud.253 At polling places, poll watchers
have targeted African-American and Latino voters, taking their
photographs and asking for identification, denying them assistance, and
sometimes even openly intimidating them.254 The 2006 national election
featured threatening letters to Latinos in California and fraudulent
campaign advertisements aimed at African Americans in Maryland.255
Such tactics take root more easily because few people of color work at
polling places,

256

and poll workers receive inadequate training to assist

non-English speaking voters. 257 Laws in most states prohibit voter
interference and intimidation, but few provide specific means of
deterring or curbing these practices.258 Intimidation and thwarting of
voters of color occurs, even absent racist animus, because continued
racial polarization in voting often makes racial targeting strategically
useful. 259 Gulfs in wealth, education, and English proficiency between
white and nonwhite voters exacerbate the electoral system's capacity to
exclude voters of color.26 ° In addition, increasing attacks on provisions
for bilingual ballots threaten further diminution of Latino and AsianAmerican voters' already low rates of electoral participation. 261 All of
these gambits make a mockery of any hope that elected officials will
enact access reforms to increase the ability of voters of color to influence
public debate. Barring or discouraging people from voting also alienates
252. See Sherry A. Swirsky, Minority Voter Intimidation: The Problem that Won't Go Away,
II TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 359, 361-62 (2002) (describing a 1986 Louisiana mailing
designed to challenge residency of African-American voters); id. at 362-63 (describing a similar
incident in North Carolina in 1990); id. at 364-65 (describing a 1990 Texas mailing that told voters
of color to destroy absentee ballots they had requested, which would bar them from voting under
state law); id. at 365 (describing calls falsely attributed to NAACP on eve of 2000 election that
urged African Americans to vote for George W. Bush).
253. See LONG SHADOW, supra note 251, at 9-11; Swirsky, supra note 252, at 359.
254. See Laughlin McDonald, The New Poll Tax, AM. PROSPECT, Dec. 30, 2002, at 26; see also
Swirsky, supra note 252, at 363 (describing Republican "ballot security" program in California that
hired uniformed security guards to patrol heavily Latino precincts).
255. See Alex Koppelman & Lauren Shell, The GOP's Dirty Deeds of 2006: Salon's Guide to
Robo-Calls, Push Polls, Vigilantes and Other Murky Dealings from this Year's Elections,
SALON.COM, Nov. 21, 2006, http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2006/11/21/cheatsheet.
256. See Barry H. Weinberg & Lyn Utrecht, Problems in America's Polling Places: How They
Can Be Stopped, II TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 401, 420 (2002).
257. Id. at 422.
258. Id. at 426.
259. See OVERTON, supra note 226, at 72-79.
260. See id. at 82.
261. See id. at 131-47.
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them from electoral and political debate, disproportionately skewing
public discourse away from their perspectives and concerns, and thus
exacerbating the conditions that make access rights imperative.
Beyond outright intimidation and interference, local control over
voting procedures creates endless opportunities for entrenched state and
local authorities to throw hurdles in the way of voters who might oppose
the status quo.26 2 The present trend toward more restrictive voting
requirements represents a retrenchment after a period of greater
inclusiveness beginning in the 1960s.263 An especially ominous addition
to the procedural gauntlet is the present campaign, engineered by
conservative groups, to impose state and local laws to require photo or
other identification for voting. At least five states have added voter
identification requirements since 2000, while political or judicial battles
264 Although
over identification laws continue in several others.
advocates of identification requirements assert an intention to curb
65
massive voting fraud, no evidence points to any serious problem.2
Given United States citizens' low rate of voter participation, relative to
earlier periods in our own history and to voting rates in other advanced
democracies, imposing burdensome and unhelpful procedural constraints
on voters seems perverse. The purpose and effect of identification laws,
however, is to discourage and inhibit voters of color and the poor. 266 The
fact that some laws provide more lenient standards for absentee votes,
which carry stronger risks of fraud but find disproportionate use among
white voters, underscores the racial strategy behind the antifraud
smokescreen. 26' The addition of identification requirements to our
electoral system's already formidable gauntlet of voting requirements
further frays the connection between elected officials and the speakers
whose contributions to democratic discourse access reforms would
enhance.
262. See id. at 45-46; Ronald Hayduk, The Weight of History: Election Reform During the
Progressive Era and Today, in DEMOCRACY'S MOMENT, supra note 238, at 29, 40-42. Even an

electoral requirement as seemingly innocuous as mandatory advance registration for voting
disproportionately deters the poor and people of color from the polls. See id. at 31.
263. See J. Morgan Kousser, The Voting Rights Act and the Two Reconstructions, in
CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING 135, 135-39 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds.,

1992) (discussing historical trends in voting requirements).
264.

at Al.
265.
266.

See Peter Wallsten, Parties Battle Over New Voter ID Laws, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2006,

See OVERTON, supra note 226, at 161-63.
See id. at 153; Swirsky, supra note 252, at 367-68.

267. See OVERTON, supra note 226, at 164 (describing Georgia identification law's more
lenient standard for absentee ballots); Wallsten, supra note 264, at A l (noting Arizona identification

statute's exception for absentee voting).
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An additional strategy for purging the rolls of poor and minority
voters is legal disenfranchisement of convicted felons. Almost every
state denies the vote to people presently incarcerated on felony
convictions.2 68 More controversially, three states permanently
disenfranchise ex-offenders. 269 Another nine states permanently
disenfranchise certain categories of ex-offenders or impose waiting
periods following the completion of an offender's sentence before
allowing application for restoration of voting rights. 270 Recent years
have seen a modest trend toward loosening restrictions on felon
voting, 22711 but several states have increased their restrictions. 272 An
estimated 5.3 million Americans may not vote as a result of felony
convictions. 273 More than two million of those ineligible voters have
completed their sentences.2 74 The racial impact of felon
disenfranchisement laws is particularly egregious, -with black men
disenfranchised at a rate seven times the national average. 275 Felon
disenfranchisement laws deny the vote to thirteen percent of all black
men-l.4 million men who would otherwise be eligible to vote.276
Convicted felons, widely despised and shunned for reasons that give
them important and underpublicized perspectives on important public
issues, epitomize the potential benefits of access reforms. Felon
disenfranchisement laws, however, ensure that this is the last group of
268. Laws in forty-eight states and the District of Columbia disenfranchise inmates while
incarcerated for felonies. The Sentencing Project, Felony DisenfranchisementLaws in the United
States, http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/1046.pdf (last visited Sept. 13, 2007) [hereinafter
Sentencing Project, Laws]. Thirty-five states disenfranchise felons on parole, and thirty of those
states also disenfranchise felons on probation. Id. Only Maine and Vermont extend voting rights to
incarcerated felons. Id.
269. Id. Florida, Kentucky, and Virginia permanently disenfranchise any person with a felony
conviction. Id. Restoration of voting rights in Florida and Kentucky must be approved by the
governor. MARC MAUER & TUSHAR KANSAL, BARRED FOR LIFE: VOTING RIGHTS RESTORATION IN
PERMANENT

DISENFRANCHISEMENT

STATES

http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/barredforlife.pdf.
courts to regain the right to vote, but persons convicted
distributing drugs may not petition. Id. at 20.
270. Sentencing Project, Laws, supranote 268.
271. Of eleven states that have adopted changes to
the past ten years, eight reduced restrictions. STEVEN
FELONY

DISENFRANCHISEMENT,

1996-2003,

10,

14

(2005),

available

at

Ex-offenders in Virginia may petition
of violent offenses or of manufacturing or

their felon disenfranchisement laws within
KALOGERAS, LEGISLATIVE CHANGES ON
at
1
(2003),
available
at

http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/legchanges-report.pdf.
272. Massachusetts and Utah have recently disenfranchised incarcerated felons, and Kansas
expanded disenfranchisement laws to felons on probation. Id.
273. Sentencing Project, Laws, supra note 268.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
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citizens to whom elected officials will ever feel responsible and from
whom the rest of us will ever hear.
Our electoral system's pathologies of unaccountability and
exclusion make trusting elected officials to implement expressive access
reforms an indefensible gamble. Accordingly, we should not be
surprised that federal media regulations in recent years have
dramatically diminished competition and diversity while further
consolidating the dominance of the largest media corporations.2 77 An
unfortunate irony of the regulatory reform critique is that our electoral
system's failure to engage and represent the people, which regulatory
reformers fail to address, ultimately reflects the same hegemony of
economic power they attack so eloquently. Regulatory reformers' faith
in the elected branches, like libertarians' faith. in the economic market,
leads to a dead end in the quest for more informative and inclusive
democratic debate. The two critiques' failures point that quest back
toward the First Amendment. Even though the Supreme Court has
exacerbated the electoral pathologies discussed in this section while
building a discouraging record on media access issues,278 constitutional
law and judicial review continue to hold far greater promise as engines
of access reform than the regulatory reform critics acknowledge.
2. Putting the "Rights" Back in Access Rights
The regulatory reform critique objects to judicially enforced First
Amendment access rights on two distinct grounds: theoretical and
institutional. On a theoretical level, regulatory reform critics reject the
First Amendment as a legal basis for expanding access to the means of
expression. 279 On an institutional level, they question judges' capacity to
develop doctrines of expanded access. 28° Both of these objections rest on
legitimate and substantial concerns. Regulatory reformers' discomfort
with constitutional rights as vessels for social change responds to
progressives' sometimes excessive reliance on litigation to implement
policy agendas in the wake of the Warren Court's rights revolution and
the subsequent conservative tilt in the country's political mood. 281 Their
277. See Goodman, supra note 65, at 1446-48 & n.209 (identifying recent regulations'
contributions to increased media concentration); Moglen, supra note 67 (condemning corporatist
character of 1996 Telecommunications Act).

278. See Magarian, Colliding Interests, supra note 48 (discussing Court's recent failures to
implement or approve many access reforms).
279.

See supra notes 205-06 and accompanying text.

280. See supra notes 207-14 and accompanying text.
281.

See TUSHNET, AWAY FROM THE COURTS, supra note 194, at 141-43 (criticizing liberals'

excessive resort to language of rights).
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institutional doubt about courts' capacity to effectuate social change
responds to courts' failures to follow through on initially promising
initiatives, such as integration of public schools, and reflects the
rhetorical difficulty of defending judicially managed social reform.2 82
The regulatory reform critique, however, substantially overstates both
the theoretical disadvantages of constitutional rights and the institutional
disadvantages of courts.
The regulatory reform critics oppose framing media access in terms
of constitutional rights because they mistrust both the general rhetoric of
rights and the particular conception of the First Amendment that
supports access rights. Both concerns implicate important normative
controversies that I have addressed elsewhere, and I reprise my views
only in summary fashion here. The regulatory reformers' general
concern reflects a valuable insight that conceptions of "rights"
necessarily depend on normative priorities in designing legal
structures.2 83 The language of rights, however, remains crucial for
arguments about expressive access as long as we acknowledge the
underlying conflicts of interests and values those arguments necessarily
embody. The First Amendment provides an analytic channel for courts'
understandings of democratic values and the people's substantive ideals
as well as a textual basis for judicial review that the people and our
elected representatives consider legitimate.284 It also offers a unique
source of rhetorical power for any argument about how speech should
function in society, including arguments for access reforms.2 85
Regulatory reformers' specific concern about the constitutional basis for
access rights arises from the gulf between their autonomy-driven
descriptive theory of the First Amendment and the egalitarian,
democracy-focused First Amendment theory Barron and other
proponents of access rights advance. Barron's sort of theory has the
strong normative advantages of deepening constitutional protection for

282. See id. at 177 (criticizing liberals' fear of voting and overreliance on judicial review to
achieve social change).
283. See BAKER, supra note 68, at 193-213 (explaining that conceptions of rights vary with
underlying normative theories of democracy); TUSHNET, AWAY FROM THE COURTS, supra note 194,
at 13 (describing role of normative differences in opposing interpretations of constitutional rights);
Balkin, Digital Speech, supra note 60, at 25-28 (describing the effect over time of changes in
prevailing normative values on changes in prevailing conceptions of constitutional rights).
284. See Magarian, Political Parties, supra note 54, at 1990 (contending that language of
rights plays proper and useful role in disputes about political structures).
285.

See Frederick

Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A

Preliminary

Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1789-90 (2004) (discussing the
"magnetism" of the First Amendment).
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especially valuable and vulnerable expression 286 and providing a
concrete, functional rationale for protecting speech that resonates with
both our society's deep commitment to participatory democracy and the
central purpose of the Constitution. 87
Beyond their substantive concerns about the First Amendment as a
basis for equalizing expressive access, the regulatory reform critics
dispute courts' capacity to direct a regime of enhanced media access
rights. This institutional competence argument has undeniable force; no
system of constitutional adjudication could, or should, micromanage
complex social controversies. But no access rights advocate has ever
pretended such micromanagement was necessary, let alone proper. How
would a constitutional access rights regime work in practice? Some
access controversies-for example, whether a media corporation may
refuse to sell advertising space to a political activist-lie fully within
courts' institutional capacities. In more complicated contexts, such as
disputes about concentration of media ownership, a court faced with a
salient dispute could articulate a strong, general First Amendment
mandate aimed at enriching and diversifying debate, resolve the
immediate dispute pursuant to that mandate, and leave the elected
branches to enact and enforce regulatory structures that satisfy the First
Amendment. To the extent the elected branches did succeed in
implementing access reforms, courts would play an essential role in
articulating the First Amendment values behind the reforms and
ensuring that regulatory enforcement advanced those values. 288 As for
the proper substantive standard, I have contended elsewhere that courts
can and should apply to expressive access controversies a principle of
"participation enhancing review., 289 That extrapolation from the familiar
idea of representation reinforcing review would lead courts, in First
Amendment disputes that set access interests against autonomy interests,
to make rulings and develop legal baselines for government action that
maximized opportunities for broad participation in public debate.
286.

See Magarian, Public-PrivateDistinction,supra note 3, at 105-14 (describing the utility

of the public rights theory of expressive freedom for effectively protecting wartime political
debate).
287. See Magarian, Political Parties,supra note 54, at 1980-88 (describing key characteristics
of public rights theory of expressive freedom).
288. See Gregory P. Magarian, Substantive Media Regulation in Three Dimensions, 76 GEO.

WASH. L. REv. (forthcoming 2008) (discussing importance of judicial review in any renewal of the
broadcast fairness doctrine).
289. See Magarian, Colliding Interests, supra note 48, at 57-65 (proposing and describing
participation enhancing review of expressive access claims). The classic theory of representation
reinforcing review does not suffice to justify adjudication of access cases, because access disputes
present competing First Amendment interests. See id. at 53-56.
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Even if we establish that courts can implement access reforms
under the First Amendment, the regulatory reform critique raises doubts
about whether courts will do so. The Supreme Court's record on access
issues in both the electoral and media contexts makes depressing
reading. Paradoxically, however, the Court's recent conservative
activism illustrates the powerful effects that changes in prevailing legal
theories can have on the distribution of expressive opportunities. Hope
for changing courts' theoretical orientation, now or at any time, rests on
the insight that judges are less institutionally beholden than elected
officials to entrenched interests. Perhaps, as regulatory reformers have
argued, our era's judicial conservatism actually reflects a historical norm
against progressive change, interrupted only briefly by the Warren
Court, that no appeal to reason can hope to dislodge.2 90 In my view,
however, judicial attitudes are too mutable, and the stakes of the access
rights issue too high, to give up the effort. I am not advancing the
argument that "we do not have the right judges," whose futility Tushnet
rightly derides. 291 I simply note that judges' orientations do change, and
have changed, through appeals and processes that circumvent the
formidable pathologies of our electoral system. Theoretical arguments
about the constitutional wisdom of access rights may well face less
resistance in the judicial sphere than political activism for access reform
faces in the legislative and regulatory spheres. In any event, nothing
about my prescription for access rights would diminish elected officials'
power to implement access reforms should they find the will to do so.
Adroitly linking the conceptual limits of rights and the institutional
limits of courts, Baker objects to access rights on the ground that the
theoretical underpinnings of democracy, and thus the optimal
distribution of media access for facilitating democracy, are highly
contestable.2 92 He supports his premise with an account of the
differences among interest group pluralism, civic republicanism, and a
293
"best of both worlds" position he labels "complex democracy."
Baker's argument transcends the partisanship of libertarian objections to

290. See SEIDMAN & TUSHNET, supra note 202, at 138 (suggesting that arguments for positive
First Amendment rights "run up against the entrenched conservative bias in constitutional law").
291. See TUSHNET, AWAY FROM THE COURTS, supra note 194, at 155-63 (expressing doubts
about theoretical appeals to courts).
292. See Baker, Media Structure, supranote 163, at 760; cf Frederick Schauer, The Role of the
People in First Amendment Theory, 74 CAL. L. REV. 761, 787'(1986) (criticizing efforts to

distinguish democracy theoretically from majoritarianism).
293. See BAKER, supra note 68, at 125-213 (evaluating implications of different democratic
theories for media policy).
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the republican underpinnings of access rights 294 by maintaining that no
theoretical perspective should achieve hegemony through the force of
constitutional law. No one could dispute Baker's premise that
democratic theory is endlessly contestable. He fails, however, to
establish why courts cannot or should not join the contest. One relatively
narrow problem with Baker's argument is that his rigid distinction
among democratic theories creates a distorted picture in which
hidebound commitments to utterly antithetical views of democracy drive
public debate-in which republicans, for example, care nothing for the
presence in public discourse of clashing points of view.29 5 Barron, in
contrast, conceived the constitutional dimension of access rights as
serving both the inclusive values Baker associates with pluralist
democracy and the informational values he associates with republican
democracy.29 6
A deeper problem with Baker's analysis is that courts neither can
nor should resolve constitutional disputes without regard to democratic
theory. Baker attempts to constrain judicial review in First Amendment
cases by distinguishing "traditional censorship," a matter about which he
claims all salient democratic theories agree, from the structural
architecture of media, a matter he calls too contestable and contingent
for constitutional adjudication.2 97 Baker's categories, however, are
themselves far more contestable and contingent than he suggests. Is a
purportedly neutral tax that disproportionately burdens particular
publications censorious or architectural? 298 What about a requirement
that broadcasters must sell advertising space at market rates to political
candidates,2 99 or that cable systems must devote part of their channel
array to stations of the government's choosing? 300 The media challengers

294.

See supra notes 176-87 and accompanying text.

295. See BAKER, supra note 68, at 148-49 (positing republican ideal of media that excludes
"[s]egmented, partisan media").
296.

See supra notes 24-29, and accompanying text (discussing dual benefits of access rights

for the general public and marginalized speakers).
297.

See Baker, Media Structure,supra note 163, at 761.

298. See Ark. Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987) (striking down sales tax
on magazines that exempted religious, professional, trade and sports magazines); Minneapolis Star
& Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983) (striking down use tax on paper
and ink that affected only a small number of newspapers); Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233
(1936) (striking down license tax on advertisements that applied only to high-circulation
newspapers).
299.

See Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 397 (1981) (upholding regulation

prohibiting broadcasters from denying advertising time to candidates).
300.

See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 520 U.S. 223, 225 (1997) (upholding

federal requirement that cable systems must carry local broadcast affiliates); Turner Broad. Sys.,
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to all of those regulations would (and did) complain of censorship, while
the government would (and did) characterize its intervention as
architectural. Both characterizations have force, and neither can save a
court seriously committed to enforcing the First Amendment from
having to consider how our democratic commitments require
constitutional expressive freedom to work. At a broader level, our
constitutional jurisprudence has never treated the theoretical
indeterminacy of a case as a basis for judicial abstention. 30 1 If courts
could not decide cases with contestable theoretical underpinnings, then
they could not enforce constitutional rights at all.
Legal realism long ago established that courts operate within, not
apart from, democratic politics. The regulatory reformers follow the line
of judicial skeptics who consider courts' inevitably political nature a
reason to constrain their use of constitutional mandates. If courts openly
declared abstract democratic principles, and then forcefully invoked
those principles to strike down a wide range of government actions, the
skeptics' concern would carry great weight. Courts, however, do not
operate that way. Instead, they sublimate the abstract theoretical grounds
for their constitutional decisions, both because Article III limits their
decisional ambit 30 2 and because not even our system of strong judicial
review confers the institutional fortitude courts would need in order to
make such sweeping pronouncements. Courts can, and must, base their
constitutional decisions on underlying democratic precepts that the
people will accept-among which, I believe, is the principle that
effective democracy requires a broad distribution of opportunities to
participate in public debate. Because background precepts are not
holdings, courts can test and alter the democratic underpinnings of their
decisions through the dialogue in which they necessarily engage with
other political actors and the people.30 3 The judicial branch, in its own
way, is as much a creature of our democratic system as Congress, and
the Judiciary's peculiar set of democratic constraints protects it, and us,
from unduly hidebound constitutional decisions.
Inc. v. FCC (Turner 1), 512 U.S. 622, 661-62 (1994) (applying intermediate scrutiny review to
must-carry rules).
301. Affirmative action cases, with their fundamental tension between formal and substantive
theories of equality, present an obvious example. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 34344 (2003) (upholding the affirmative action component of a law school's admissions policy).
302. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. I (restricting federal courts to decisions of "Cases" and
"Controversies").
303. See generally Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577
(1993) (arguing that dialogue among different governmental institutions and the people drives
constitutional interpretation).
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CONCLUSION

For at least fifteen years, judicial and scholarly attention to the idea
of First Amendment access rights has ranged from dismissive to hostile.
Far too often the critics have gotten a free pass. Libertarians deride
access rights as an authoritarian plot against market distributions of
expressive opportunities. Their market triumphalism, however, papers
over the severe doctrinal, theoretical, and above all normative failings of
a constitutional vision that substitutes economic power for robust public
debate. Regulatory reformers extol the possibilities of legislative and
regulatory access reform while dismissing the prospects of judicially
enforced access rights. Their inattention to our electoral system's
pathologies of unaccountability and exclusion, however, fatally skews
their institutional prescription. The time has come to reclaim and extend
the trail Jerome Barron blazed forty years ago. Deploying an egalitarian
First Amendment theory in pursuit of a democratic discourse that would
better inform the political community while giving greater voice to that
community's poor and marginalized members, Barron's case for access
rights offers a bold, optimistic blueprint for the expressive freedom a
self-governing people needs and deserves.
Recent fashion's regrettable disdain for access rights has diverted
attention from the pivotal questions of what forms access rights should
take and which institution(s) should determine those forms. Although
this Article takes sharp issue with the regulatory reform critique of
access rights, the regulatory reformers deserve credit for asking
important questions about how best to broaden expressive access. As
Barron's own writings acknowledge, we cannot expect constitutional
courts alone to transform the expressive landscape. Any effective
broadening of access will require the elected branches' political
authority and policymaking expertise. Accordingly, access rights
advocates might benefit in the near term from turning intellectual energy
toward securing judicial scrutiny of the electoral pathologies that
presently undermine aspirations toward legislative and regulatory access
reforms. Legal theorists usually address what I have called the electoral
pathologies of unaccountability and exclusion under equal protection
principles. Because those pathologies directly impede informative and
inclusive political debate, however, they also offend the same First
Amendment values at stake in media access controversies. Pursuing
judicial scrutiny of electoral structures under the First Amendment in
order to enable access reforms would acknowledge the elected branches'
essential role in expanding media access while reaffirming Barron's
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wisdom in articulating a First Amendment foundation
expansion-a foundation of access rights.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2007

1431

for that

59

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 3 [2007], Art. 13

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol35/iss3/13

60

